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JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the final decision and order of the
Third Judicial Circuit Court by Judge Paul G. Grant dated
July 31, 1990; and the final decision and order of the same
Court on Appellant's Motion for New Trial dated September 29,
1990.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

In presenting pleadings and testimony to the trial

court did the defense counsel commit "fraud upon the court" in
presenting evidence to justify defense assertions for a finding
of "bad faith" against the plaintiff/appellant by the trial
court, or make material fact misrepresentations in the pleadings
submitted or testified thereto in open court, or otherwise
commit misconduct, to such a level or degree that justice would
require relief to the plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and
(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby rendering the
judgement invalid?
The standard of review for this issue is the substantive
test of material fact, clearly erroneous standard, and abuse of
discretion standard.
Standards of Review, by Steven A. Childress and Martha S.
Davis, [KF 4575 C48 (1986), §5.2 and § 5.6].
2.

Did the plaintiff/appellant provide sufficient evi-

dence for the trial court upon his motion for a new trial to
show merit due to unforseen circumstances under Rule 59(a)(3),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

And did the trial court abuse

-1-

abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff/appellants Motion
for a New Trial?
The standard of Review for this issue is the abuse of
discretion standard.

Standards of Review, by Childress and Davis,

§5.6 [KF 4575 C48 (1986) ].
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting

judgement against the plaintiff, when there still were motions
for Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel (which alleged bad
faith representation of material facts at issue before the court)
still pending when the aforesaid judgement was granted to the
defendants?
The standard of review is the abuse of discretion and
clearly erroneous standards.

Standards of Review, by Childress

and Davis, § 5.6 [KF 4575 C48 (1986)].

-2-

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following Utah Statutes and Rules are set-forth in the
addendum to this brief in Appendix K.
Statutes
11 United States Code § 362

Automatic Stay

Utah Annotated Code,

Service of Process

§ 16-10-13

§ 31A-2-310 Service of Process
§ 41-6-32

Notice of Accident

§ 76-10-801 Nuisances
§ 76-10-803 Public Nuisances
§ 76-10-808 Civil Remedy Allowed1
Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 3

Commencing Action

Rule 4

Service of Process

Rule 8

Pleadings, general

Rule 10

Pleadings, form of

Rule 11

Pleadings, sanctions

Rule 52

Findings by Court

Rule 59

New Trials

Rule 60

Relief from Judgement

-3-

Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 201

Judicial Notice

Rule 602

Personal Knowledge

Rule 701

Lay Witness Testimony

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 29

Oral Arguments

All citations in this brief hereinafter also make parallel
reference to Utah Annotated Code § 78-38-1 with regards to
statutory remedy to civil action for relief of damages as
a result of nuisances under § 76-10-801, 76-10-803, or
76-10-808, U.A.C.

-3A-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff filed a claim for damages to his automobile in
the Third Circuit Court stemming from a nighttime accident on
the property of the defendants, and a claim for medical bills,
pain and suffering stemming from aggravation of pre-existing
medical conditions of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that

the defendants placed an obstruction in the roadway, and failed
to properly make the obstruction plainly visible at night when
said obstruction was painted the same color of a background
light pole and similarly dark-colored gas pumps (dark green).
Plaintiff argued that said conduct constituted a nuisance and a
public nuisance, that breached their legal duty to provide a
safe passage to plaintiff and his passengers.

Plaintiff further
2

alleged unlawful co-ercion and threat by defendants in order to
prevent the plaintiff was exercising his rights under §76-10-808,
Utah Annotated Code, which specified a civil action against a
defendant who maintained a nuisance to recover damages.
Course of Proceedings
Appellant filed a complaint against the appellees on
October 21, 1989 for damages resulting from an accident on or
about March 26-27, 1989 in Provo, Utah County, Utah.

Defendant

Kemper Group was dismissed from the suit on April 4, 1990.
Trial was scheduled for July 16, 1990, however, due to the
appellants illness and incapacity, only defense counsel appeared.
-4-

Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Notice of
Appeal before July 29, 1990.

On July 31, 1990, a judgement

dismissing this action was signed by Third Circuit Court Judge
Paul G. Grant.

Appellants Motion for a new trial was denied

on September 29, 1990.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an

automatic stay on further proceedings was issued by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division on behalf of defendant Southland Corporation.
The stay was terminated by the Bankruptcy Court effective
March 5, 1991, as affirmed by notice received from defense
counsel on or about March 21, 1991.
Disposition at Trial Court
The trial court dismissed appellant's action with a finding
of bad faith when the trial judge signed an order prepared by the
defense counsel on July 31, 1990.
The trial court dismissed appellantfs motion for a new trial
on September 29, 1990 by a journal minute entry.
Relevant Facts
One of the central issues in this appeal involved an allegation of misrepresentation, misconduct, or "fraud upon the court".
Central facts related to this allegation is testimony by the
defense counsel at trial that asserted that appellants malpractice suit was dismissed (transcript: page 2, line 23-25).

The

trial date was July 16, 1990; the matter of Barron v. Dr. Thomas
M. Kelley, MP, et al. was not dismissed until May 8, 1991, which
was almost ten (10) months after the trial date.
[Transcript in Appendix D;
-5-

Barron v. Kelley et al is

located in Appendix B.]
Other relevant facts will not be discussed here inasmuch
as they offer interpretations and conclusions that are more
correctly a part of the argument.
Since the appellant does not seek a de novo review on the
merits of the original cause of action, but only to set aside
the judgement, detailed facts in this matter will only be
offered as they are material to the issues on appeal.
was based on an automobile accident on appellee's

The claim
of

business on or about March 26-27, 1989, at approximately 12:30
A.M.

Appellant approached the pump island at an angle, and struck

a black guard post that was approximately 23 inches from the gas
pumps (and/or pump island).

At the time of the accident, the

aforesaid gas pumps were painted dark green, and the light pole
beside the pumps was painted black.

Appellants son was a witness

and passenger at the time of the accident.

1
Appellants personal files and original papers are in storage
in Salt Lake City, and the exact date in not known, but
appellant believes the Motion for New Trial was filed on
July 19, 1990; and the Notice of Appeal was filed on
August 30, 1990 - within 30 days of the date the judgement
was signed by Judge Grant.
See Appendix C.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

On October 21, 1989, the appellant William Paul Barron, Jr.
filed a complaint against the appellees alleging that the
defendants were negligent in causing the accident by placing an
unmarked, or poorly marked, obstruction in the roadway.

The

appellant contends that the coloring of the guard post was so
indistinguisable from the background light post and gas pumps,
and was, by virtue of its placement in the roadway, a nuisance
to traffic.

Appellant's claim for relief was based upon the

provisions of § 76-10-808 of the Utah Annotated Code that
provided civil remedy for relief on damages caused proximally
from a nuisance.

[See Appendix A.]

Appellees have asserted that appellant failed to exercise
a

high degree of care and proper lookout, and maintained that

appellants claim for relief was frivolous and without merit.
[See letter from Dennis Opl, dated November 2, 1989, Appendix C.]
Kemper Group of Insurance Companies was dismissed from the
suit on April 4, 1990, because Utah law did not permit a direct
action against the insurance carrier.
Trial was first scheduled for hearing in January or therebout and was rescheduled to July 16, 1990, based upon objections
raised by the appellant that discovery had not been completed.
The trial court sustained appellant's Motion for Order to Compel
Discovery shortly before this first scheduling of trial by the
-7-

defense counsel.
Prior to the trial date the appellant filed two (2) motions
for sanctions against the defense counsel pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The substance of the reasons

for the appellants motion was the contention that the defense
counsel had mispresented material facts, statements and allegations of the complainant, or had made untrue assertions to the
trial court knowing that they were not true.
Prior to the trial date the appellant had provided a large
body of medical information and records, and further kept the
defense counsel abreast of the current medical condition of the
appellant.

Appellant reported to the defense counsel in the

weeks prior to the trial alternate means of communication in an
emergency because appellants telephone service was disconnected/
Appellant further advised defense counsel of recent medical
treatment and episodes of cardiac syncopy and incapacity.

The

appellant made every effort to inform defense counsel of such
circumstances that could delay his appearance (e.g. hospitalization), because the appellant had every intention and desire to
press his claim at trial.

Appellant took such precautions as he

deemed prudent because the appellant was experiencing health
3
problems immediately prior to the trial.
On the day scheduled for trial the appellant became ill and
incapacitated.

Defense counsel asserted that the appellant had

prosecuted this action in bad faith, and secured a judgement to
-8-

that effect on July 31, 1990.

The appellant contends that at

the trial defense counsel withheld knowledge of appellants
medical condition as a possible explanation for non-appearance,
and made several assertions to secure a finding of bad faith
with full knowledge that those assertions were either completely
false or misleading.

On appeal appellant asserts that this

misconduct, mispresentation or fraud only followed established
conduct from onset of the action, and that defense counsel was
fully culpable for said conduct.
4
Appellant further contends that the trial court knew that
strong objections had been made against defense counsel's
conduct, and that such conduct had a material bearing on the
appellants case and the issue of appellees allegation of "bad
faith" by the appellant.

Armed with such knowledge, a judgement

for bad faith was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial within the ten (10)
day requirement of Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3) and

asserted that appellants non-appearance was an accident or
surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
due to appellants unforseen incapacitation on the day of trial.
Appellant asserts that sufficient testimony of his incapacitation and medical evidence and other factors, such as loss of
telepone service, existed to warrant a new trial.

Further, in

view of the motions for sanctions against alleged misconduct of
the defense counsel, the denial of the motion by the trial court
-9-

was an abuse of discretion.
Because the appellant has relocated to Ohio, he does not
seek a new trial.

Appellants poverty prevents his return to

Utah in the foreseeable future, therefore, he could not
prosecute his claim even if the court found that a new trial
was warranted.

Appellant seeks only the equitable discharge

from the judgement imposed by the trial court because of the
misrepresentations, misconduct, or fraud of the defense counsel
in securing that judgement.

Because appellant's papers are in storage in Utah, he can
not say with certainty, the date on which appellees' counsel
first certified readiness for trial, but that it was in the
early part of 1990 (i.e. January or February).
2
Notification to appellees' counsel in Appendix H.
3
See notification in Appendix H.
4
See documentation in Appendix I.
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
Introduction
Appellees' counsel asserts that appellants suit was brought
in bad faith [see trial transcript, page 2 line 2, Appendix D]
and in the supporting memorandum for a motion for summary
disposition dated June 24, 1991, and stated for the record:

In the trial court, the appellant brought a claim
of questionable merit which was unsubstantiated
by fact. The trial court acknowledged the meritless nature of the claim by dismissing the claim
with a finding that the suit was brought in bad
faith. This appeal is a continuation of questionable claims unsubstantiated by fact. [p. 4, lines
19-25. ]
The appellants suit and claim arose from an accident during
the night of March 26-27, 1989, when the appellant struck a post
approximately 23" from either the pump island or the the gas
pump .

The accident occurred in the city of Provo, Utah, at

the corner of Columbia Aveune and 1200 West at approximately
12:30 A.M.
Upon impact, both the appellant and his son were appalled
because appellants auto was almost two feet away from the gas
pump.

After exiting vehicle they determined that the object

struck was a concrete-filled metal post about two feet from the
gas pumps, and was unnoticeable at night because the post was
painted black, and lacked any reflective coloring, striping or
other visible markings on the roadway obstruction.

Additionally,

Visibility was made even more difficult due to background coloring.

The gas pumps were painted dark green, and the light pole
-11-

was painted black.
Appellant pulled into the 7-11 Store refueling station off
Columbia Avenue northbound, and approached the pump island at an
angle of approximately forty-five degrees across the parking lot.
Approaching the pump island, appellant turned his vehicle in
order to place his vehicle parallel to the pumps.
time that the guard post was struck.

It was at this

At this angle of approach,

the guard post was in direct alignment with the light pole, which
was also painted black, and partially centered on the line-of2
sight with the nearest gas pump.
Neither the appellant nor his
primary witness, son Donald Eric Barron, observed any obstruction or danger in the vehicle's path of approach to the pumps
prior to the impact with the guard post.
After the collision, the appellant refueled and informed the
clerk on duty of the accident, and requested reporting instructions, in accordance with the provisions of § 41-6-32, Utah
Annotated Code (hereinafter cited as U.A.C.)

Appellant also

requested that the store manager be advised to place some type
of reflective markings on the post in order to avoid any further
mishaps.
For the next six months appellant received no response to
his claim for damages from Southland Corporation, which owns and
operated the 7-11 Store in Provo, inspite of several letters and
telephone calls.

Finally, the appellant received a letter from

Dennis Opl, insurance adjustor for Kemper Group,
1989 [See Appendix C.]

on November 2,

Mr. Opl first asserted that my claim was
-12-

frivolous, and that if I pressed my claim for damages in court
that they would demand a ruling of "bad faith".
Prior to initiating legal proceedings, appellant sought the
advice of legal counsel, concerning this matter and proceeded
upon that advice to establish the claim in court.

Because of

appellant's poverty, legal advice was the extent of services
obtained from John W. Call, Attorney-at-Law.

Appellant went

to the University of Utah Law Library to research applicable
statutes and case law that might be pertinent to his case. [See
Appendix A.]
3
Based upon legal advice thus far obtained, and research in
law performed, appellant firmly believed that the three elements
of a tort action in this matter were fulfilled.

In reading

§ 76-10-801, U.A.C. appellant learned that a nuisance was cited
as "anything, item, manner, or condition whatsoever that is
dangerous to human life or health", and that a public nuisance
was cited in § 76-10-803, U.A.C. as "omitting to perform any
duty, which ommission either annoys, injures, or endangers the
comfort, repose, health or safety of three or more persons, or
unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or
renders dangerous for passage any ... street, highway, or in any
way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of
property."

These statutes outlined the existence of a legal

duty from the defendants to the plaintiff.
The appellant asserted that by placing an obstruction in
the path of his vehicle, and failing to properly mark that
obstruction, i.e. the guard post, in such a manner to make it
-13-

visible after sunset, at night, and particularly on a moonless
night that was the case on March 26-27, 1989, that the defendants
breached their legal duty to the appellant and his passengers, his
son and daughter, and their friend.

Further, the breach of that

duty placed the appellant and his passengers "insecure in life or
the use of property1", i.e. insecure in making a stop at a public
place of business without injury or harm, and in which said
negligence was the proximate cause of damage sustained to the
appellants automobile.

Therefore, all three elements of a tort

claim against the tortfeasor, Southland Corporation dba 7-11
Stores, and Citgo Petroleum Corporation, whose product for retail
sales was marketed at that location and whose gasoline pumps and
elemental attachments thereto, were met in the appellants claim.
The only element missing is a proper claim for relief.

Under

§ 76-10-808, U.A.C. state statutes provided civil remedy for
relief from damages as a proximate result of negligence for maintaining a nuisance as described under the aforesaid statutes,
§ 76-10-801 and 76-10-803, U.A.C.
The appellant lacks formal legal training, but did graduate
from Bowling Green State University maintaining a 3.850 grade
point average in his major field of study.

Appellant sought and

obtained preliminary legal advice, and performed all relevant
4
research into law to the best of his ability and knowledge.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter cited as
U.R.C.P.), states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes
-14-

a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.
The appellant possesses the mental faculties to make a reasonable inquiry and to perform basic legal research into his problem,
after initial advice by an attorney at law, in order to formulate
a good faith argument and belief upon filing his complaint with
trial court.

Even though the presentation may lack the polish of

a seasoned attorney, and even though his pleadings may have had
minor defects in form, appellant proceeded in this cause of action
based upon a reasonable belief that there was a claim upon which
relief was had under Utah law, and acted in every measure in good
faith.
Every pleading submitted to the trial court by the appellant
was made in accordance with Rule 8(a), (e)(1) and (2), and (f),
Rule 10, and Rule 11, U.R.C.P.

Appellants complaint and pleadings

were not very technical, perhaps, in that they they may have
lacked numerous citations to case law that an attorney with time
and expetise may have made; but every pleading was concise in that
it

gave fair notice of the nature, basis, or grounds of his claim.

This was sufficient unless appellant would be entitled to no
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of his claim. Blackman v. Snelqrove, 3 Utah 2d. 157, 280, 280 P.2d
453 (1955).

Further, the fundamental purpose of the liberalized
-15-

pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute, subject only to the reguirement that their adversaries
have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
The second consideration on the guestion whether appellant
brought forth a claim of guestionable merit would be determined
- in normal proceedings - during the course of trial, wherein
the testimony and evidence assembled by the appellant would be
judged.
During the course of discovery, appellees by and through
their counsel, T. J. Tsakalos #3289, were provided with maps,
diagrams, and photos prepared by the appellant of the accident
site, during both daylight and nighttime hours.

These items were

prepared to show the appellants angle of approach to the obstruction, the distances and angles involved.

The appellant also

provided appelles with a computer enhancement photo rendition of
what the appellant saw that night, by using color copier technology at Kinko's of Salt Lake City, Inc., to render a color photo
taken several weeks after the accident (which was by then painted
white instead of dark green) as it looked at the time of the
accident, on the moonless night of March 26-27, 1989.

This color

copy photograph, which was enlarged, showed the position and the
alignment of the guard post to the light pole and gas pump at the
-16-

approach angle the appellant drove towards the obstruction on the
night of the accident.

In order to simulate a night photo, this

copy was again copied with grey overtone and shading which aided
appellant in showing how obscure the post would look at night
when two posts of like color were aligned as they were when the
5
appellant made his approach.
Therefore, appellant would contend that appellees1 averment
that appellants claim had guestionable merit and was unsubstantiated by fact to be wholly and totally false.

Appellant would

further contend that the trial court merely consented to the
defense counsel averments because no specific findings of fact or
law were made by the trial court on July 16, 1990fduring the
proceedings absented by the appellant, either orally as shown in
the trial transcript, or in the entry of judgement prepared by
appellees by and through counsel, as reguired by Rule 41(b) and
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.

Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (U.C.A. 1989).

Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514 (U.C.A. 1989).

Appellants papers and files were placed in storage upon his
departure from Utah in March 1991, due to loss of lease on
his residence; therefore, appellant can not say with certainty
whether this 23" measurement was from the gas pump to the post
or from the concrete island to the pump.
Another map, of approximate proportions, in order to illustrate is at Appendix F. Original papers in storage as above.
See case law research and correspondence in Appendix A.
See case law research and correspondence in Appendix A.
See reconstructed drawing for approximation in Appendix F.
Appellant's original papers in storage in Salt Lake City.
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Questions For Review
A discussion of each issue presented by the appellant on
appeal will be discussed individualy.

Only three issues that

were originally described in the Docketing Statement will be discussed hereafter, as the other issues are now moot.

The questions

shown hereafter exhibit changes in syntax or additional words or
phrases in order to give clearer meaning to the issues that the
appellant is seeking review.

[These changes appeared in bold face

type in the appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
Support of Appellant's Objections to Appellees Motion For Summary
Disposition dated July 2, 1991.]

1.

In presenting pleadings and testimony to the trial
court, did the defense counsel (T.J. Tsakalos #3289)
commit "fraud upon the court", mispresentation, or
misconduct in presenting evidence to justify defense
assertions for a finding of "bad faith" by the trial
court, or make material fact misrepresentations in
the pleadings submitted or testified thereto in open
court, or otherwise commit misconduct, to such a
level or degree that justice would require relief to
the plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and (7), of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby rendering
the judgement against the appellant invalid?

On two separate occassions, in early January or February
1990, and October 1, 1989, the appellant entered Objections and a
Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. (see record on
Appeal) against defense counsel Mr. Tsakalos #3289 for alleged
misconduct, misrepresentation, and/or fraud.
The nature of these allegations was based upon appellants
contention that counsel seriously misrepresented material facts
or distorted plaintiff's assertions to the court.
-18-

In particular,

defense counsel misrepresented the appellants claim, and the
particulars of the accident, stating in various pleadings that
"the plaintiff backed his cars into the gas pumps", or "Mr.
Barron was driving his car and ran into our pumps and sued us."
(See transcript, page 2, line 16-17, Appendix D).

In another

pleading, Mr. Tsakalos certified to the trial court, approximately
January 1990,2 that the action was ready for trial. Discovery had
not been completed, and several items and motions were still outstanding.

At one point, appellant had to compell appellees counsel

to provide discovery material by motion, which was favorably ruled
upon by the trial court.
Mr. Tsakalos stated in the Memorandum (page 6, line 13-14),

3

that "Neither does the statement that the appellant ran into the
pumps rather that ran into a protective barrier situated next to
the pumps constitutes fraud upon the court."

The material facts

in this case depend upon an exact set of circumstances, because in
no other would the appellant have a claim upon which relief could
be granted.

Appellees have set forth a conclusion, then turned the

facts to match that conclusion, even if it meant distorting or
misrepresenting the claims and allegations made by the plaintiff.
However the most serious breach of misconduct occurred on the
date set for trial on July 16, 1990.

Appellees counsel made cer-

tain allegations and incorporated them as the basis for his motion
to dismiss and for a finding of "bad faith" against the appellant.
4
In the Memorandum Mr. Tsakalos stated that he "did not
intentionally misrepresent any facts pertaining to appellants1
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other litigation." (Line 12-13, page 6 ) .
The trial transcript records Mr. Tsakalos remarks as follows:
I also brought a claim for bad faith in this, your
honor. Just for the record, in October of '89, he
brought a malpractise suit on his own against a
doctor in LDS Hospital and IHC, and that has been
dismissed. On June 26, '89 he sued Charter-Summit
Hospital and several people and that -- pro se, and
that has been dismissed. On June 25, f 89, he sued
Midvale City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed.
On October 31 of '89, he sued the State of
California and the California Department of Food and
Agriculture, 'cuase they stopped him at the border,
wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and vegatables.
That was dismissed in the United States District
Court. On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit
again and that has been dismissed. November 16, f 89,
he sued the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax
Commission for his taxes. I think that one has been
dismissed, and then he sued us when our pumps did
not get out of his way,and now has not appeared.
[See Appendix D, page 2, line 23, through page 3,
line 13. ]
At issue is whether defense counsel's representations to the trial
court constituted misconduct, misrepresentations or fraud upon the
5
court. Mr. Tsakalos contends in the Memorandum that he "had no
duty to elaborate further".

He has made an issue of the fact that

the appellant is appearing pro se, with the implication that that
fact lessens the appellant's credibility; and that the appellant
was found to be in "bad faith" "in part due to numerous other
suits brought by the appellant at approximately the same time."
(See Memorandum

page 2, line 4-6).

Since he has characterized

appellants other actions as frivolous and without merit, their
true character and nature are material facts to that assertion
to the trial court; and are reviewable under the Material Fact
and Clearly Erroneous Doctrine as to their veracity.
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In the course of discovery, the appellant provided defense
7
counsel with a list of other cases, and as his testimony demonstrates he was familiar with those cases.

In most normal cir-

cumstances, as he asserted, he may not have been under any obligation to explain in detail the status of other litigation by
the appellant.

However, the canon of ethics would require that

he provide the trial court with sufficient detail to justify his
conclusions, especially since he is using the weight of this
evidence to show "bad faith" on the part of the appellant, and
because the trial court is relying on this testimony to make a
finding of "bad faith".

It would follow then that whether these

allegations are truthful or not, or whether their characterization is truthful or not, would have great bearing on the court's
decision.
The first case cited by Mr. Tsakalos consisted to total and
utter fabrication.

He represented to the trial court that the

matter of Barron v. Dr. Kelly, MP, et al, 890906515-CV, 3d DC,
was dismissed as of trial date on July 16, 1990.

In fact this

case was not dismissed without prejudice until May 8, 1991; which
is almost ten months later than defense counsels assertion.

He

is fully culpable for this falsehood made to the trial court.
he knew of the case, he should --

If

know the status, or could have

ascertained it. [See Appendix B.]
The other assertions by Mr. Tsakalos consisted of a number of
misrepresentations and distortions.
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He averred that in the matter

of Barron v. Charter-Summit Hosptial et al, 890903923-CV, 3d DC,
was dismissed on July 31, 1989 pursuant to an agreement and
settlement of all issues acceptable to the parties and a request
for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P.

This does

not follow appellees characterization of "bad faith". [Appendix G]
In the matter of Barron v. The City of Midvale Utah et al,
890903924-CV, 3d DC, a stipulation and motion for voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P. was signed January 18,
1990, said action having been fully compromised to the satisfaction
of all parties.

Again, the facts of this case do not follow the

appellee's characterization of "bad faith". [See Appendix G.]
In the matter of Barron v. The State of California et al,
89-C-983-G and 89-C-1056-S, DC of Utah, a number of mispresentations and falsehoods occur.

Mr. Tsakalos averred that the nature

of this claim was a suit "'cause they stopped him at the border,
wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and vegetables".

The case

was docketed under the heading "CONSPIRACY AGAINST CITIZENS
RIGHTS", and was characterized as a civil rights action for illegal
search and seizure.

Appellees characterized this suit as a frivo-

lous matter over fruits and vegetables in order to affirm their
contention of "bad faith."

However, in the Memorandum Decision

and Order dismissing the action on August 15, 1990, by Judge
Greene of the United States District Court, District of Utah,
Central Division, the court held that the appellant acted with
"sincerity and earnestness" (See Order, page 2, line 17, Appendix
G).

Further, Mr. Tsakalos characterized this case as two separate

filings; one which was filed on October 31, 1989, and promptly
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dismissed and then re-filed again on November 29, 1989.

The true

facts in this matter are that the Clerk of Court inadvertently
filed a second copy as an original action.

This was corrected by

an Order of Consolidation, which was entered on January 19, 1990.
[See Order of Consolidation, Appendix G.]

This situation is

similar to this appeal when the Clerk of Court entered this appeal
a second time, when the automatic stay imposed by the U.S. Bankrputcy Court in Dallas under 11 U.S.C. § 362 was lifted on March 5,
1991.

The original appeal, which was first filed on August 30,

1990, and the "second" appeal were consolidated.

Even in this

case, Mr. Tsakalos misrepresented the facts to support a conclusion
that could not be sustained by those facts.
In the matter of Barron v. The State of Utah, and the Utah Tax
Commission, CA 90-4092, 10th Cir., was presented with some doubt as
to it's status.

This was the only case which was properly noted by

the appellee's counsel.

This suit involved issues concerning state

taxation of federal retiree's compensation which were raised in the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Miciqan.
This case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the U.S.
District Court after the trial date, and affirmed by the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals on February 29, 1991.

The mispresenta-

tion by appellee's counsel, however, was to characterize this case
also as one base in frivolity and wholly without merit.

In fact

the case presented by the appellant was patterned after a similar
case in the state courts, and was an extention of the Supreme
Court's Davis v. Michigan

decision to the situation in Utah.

[See Appendix G. ]
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In the course of discovery, appellee's counsel requested,
and was provided with detailed medical records and information on
the appellant's medical history and condition.

He specifically

requested information on how the appellant was disabled, or incapacitated by his condition.
Additionally, counsel for the appellees was advised in June
1990, that the appellant had been ill during the past month (i.e.
from approximately May 1, 1990 to June 1, 1990), and had been
incapacitated with cardiac syncopy.

He was also advised that the

appellant no longer had telephone service; and that should any
situation arise where contact with the appellant was necessary,
then appellee's counsel was advised to make contact through the
appellants apartment manager.
It can be argued that the adversary counsel is not obligated
to perform the complaintant's duties; however, the canon of ethics
require one to advise the court fully of all material facts.

Then

o

counsel may argue his interpretation of those facts.
For the record, the appellant also advised the court of this
change in circumstance.

In rendering any decision against the

appellant, the trial court must weigh all facts before it, and
to do otherwise is an abuse of discretion.

Certaintly the trial

court may take judicial notice of two unresolved motions for
sanctions made by the appellant, and suporting documentation which
included reference to the appellant's health status and poverty,
and particularly specific notations in correspondence and courtesy
copies of materials sent to the trial judge pursuant to Rule 201
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of the Utah Rules of Evidence (hereinafter cited as U.R.E.)
Appendix I.]

[See

Warren v. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 P.28 (1900).

State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905, 83 Am. St. R. 768 (1900).
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Co., 80 Utah 105,
13 P.2d 320 (1932).
1978).

In interest of J

, 576 P.2d 1280 (Utah

Robison v. Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 30 (1927).

Spencer

v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (1933).
Defense counsel has asserted that this cause of action and
appeal was questionable in merit, and alluded that all previous
cases filed at approximately the same time period (i.e. the latter
half of 1989) were all similarly without merit or frivolous.

The

appellant has herein demonstrated that Mr. Tsakalos made averments
under oath in open court - knowlingly and with malicious intent that were total falsehoods, or so distorted as to make a false
characterization of the true facts.

Appellee's counsel did not

make truthful and complete averments, then offer an interpretation
of those facts to the trial court.

Rather, facts were abused into

unrecognizable forms in order to fit the characterization of the
appellant throughout the course of these proceedings.

Those

characterizations included the bias against appellant for acting
pro se, and a buffoon who ran into a well-marked structure that he
should have been familar with, and a rascallion who sought a deeppockets suit out of poverty.
Appellant would contend that these positions are contrary to
the material facts in this case and established law.

Both federal

and state law provide for access to impecunious litigants to the
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courts.

In accordance with the principles of equity and justice

under English Common Law, the courts have extend poor litigants
proeeding on their own more latitude in presenting their claims
in order to place them in an equal footing before the court as
attorneys at law.

During the first half of the nineteenth

century the courts drew heavily upon the Federalist Papers and
other writings of our founding fathers in order to embody other
principles pecular to the American experience, and added those
principles to the common law, which appellant would refer to as
American common law.

Although not formally recognized, or for-

mally stated as such, these principles today are generally
recognized as cliches, such as: We the people, government of
-by - and for the people, due process, equal justice before the
law, no man is above the law, a nation of law not of man, etc.
In the spirit of this law, the allowance for the vacation
of a judgement is a creature of equity.

It is designed to relieve

a party from the harshness of enforcing a judgement resulting from
such causes as: the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes
preventing the presentation of a claim or a defense.
Appellant is asserting a claim for relief from the judgement
under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. which states in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a
final judgement, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; >.. (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), mispresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; ... (7) or any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
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the judgement.
Appellant contends that under the provisions Of Rule 60(b)(1),
U.R.C.P./ inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect would be
constituted by the facts surrounding appellants absence from
the trial.

Appellant had begun to suffer cardiac syncopy and

periods of incapacity [See Appendix J], and had so informed the
other parties to this case [See Appendix H ] . Appellant was also
without phone service in the weeks just prior to tfte trial date,
and had so informed the other parties to this case/ and had made
arrangement for supplementary contact procedure in the event of
emergency or necessity [See Appendix H].

Illness alone is not a

sufficient excuse to make neglect a ground for vacating the
judgement.
(1953).

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416. 260 P.2d 741

However, appellant would argue that illness, incapacity

as demonstrated by medical history, lack of means and time to
make proper notice on the date of trial, and prior notice of such
conditons that could create a problem and a proferred arrangement
for emergency contact, do present sufficient cause to extend the
provisions of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect
to this situation. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
Appellant contends that under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(3),
U.R.C.Pw

the misrepresentation or misconduct by opposing counsel

in presenting under oath in open court testimony tftat has been
shown to be total fabrication or false or misleading would constitute grounds for vacating the judgement.

If the court would find

that these actions by opposing counsel constituted "fraud upon the
court11, relief from the judgement would normally proceed by means
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of an independent action against opposing counsel, Mr. Tsakalos.
Shaw v.

Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d. 222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959).

Despain, 682 P.2d 849 (Utah 1984).

Despain v.

Because appellant has removed

from the state of Utah, is disabled for multiple causes, and is
still impecunious, appellant would not be able to seek relief under
this gravamen in Utah courts; therefore, appellant would argue for
reversal of previous precedent for "fraud upon the court" in the
particular situation of the appellant, barring of course, a favorable finding under misconduct or misrepresentation provisions of
the rule.
Appellant contends that under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7),
U.R.C.P. other reasons for relief include abuse of discretion by
the trial court in granting judgement.

Any evidence which had a

bearing on the assertions made by opposing counsel is a matter of
material fact subject to review on the same standards. First Jersey
National Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd., 726 F.2d 335, 338 (3rd Cir.
1983).

These assertions were made known to the trial court via

appellants motions for sanctions under Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and
other documents and pleadings forwarded to the trial court in the
course of these proceedings.

Opposing counsel erred on the side

of ethical misconduct by withholding material facts from the court
in both oral testimony and written pleadings.

The trial court

erred in not considering the issues raised by the appellant prior
to granting a judgement in favor of the appellees for appellants
alleged "bad faith".

This is especially the case when all pre-

vious pleadings and motions by the appellant exhibited an aggressive desire to prosecute his claim before the court.
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In consideration of all the facts and circumstances, it is
appropriate to review granting of the judgement under the abuse
of discretion doctrine, and to set aside the judgement under one
on several causes.

Appellant took timely action to seek relief

from the judgement by both filing a motion for new trial, and
appeal from the judgement.

Relief is warranted because of the

harshness of enforcing the judgement because of opposing
counsel's misconduct, mispresentation or fraud, and the misfortunes that prevented the presentation of the appellants claim.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 260 P.2d 741, 123 Utah 416
(1953).

Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d. 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962).

Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).

Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah C.A. 1989).

Appellant removed from Utah in March 1991, and most of the
papers and files were placed in storage. At this time, the
appellant can not say with authority which pleadings were
involved, but the two Motions for Sanctions should have the
particulars, and be found in the Record on Appeal.
Exact date unknown as appellant does not have access to all
papers. Personal files are in storage, and appellant can n
view the record on appeal because he currently resides in
Ohio.
Memorandum cited is appellees' Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Appellees* Motion for Summary
Disposition dated June 24, 1991.
4

Ibid., page 6, lines 11-13.

5

Ibid., page 6, line 11.

6

Ibid.
This list was not a comprehensive listing of cases, rather
was just a list of case titles and courts of juridiction, a
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far as I know, or recollect.
Appellant does not offer any case law or other authority
because appellant is not able to undertake legal research
at this time, because he is not able to quickly or conveniently locate and drive to a law library with adequate
resources appropriate to Utah law. This argument is made
in accordance with standard ethical considerations.
Case citation: Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 260 P.2d
741, 123 Utah 416 (1953).
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Questions for Review, Part II
2.

Did Appellant provide sufficient evidence for the
trial court upon his motion for a new trial to
show merit due circumstances provided for under
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? And
did the trial court abuse its' discretion in
denying the appellant's motion for a new trial?

Appellant was not able to be present because he was ill and
incapacitated from an episode of cardiac syncopy [See Appendix J]
on the date scheduled for trial.

Appellant filed a Motion for a

New Trial pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.CP.
on July 19, 1991, and hand-carried the same to the court.

Upon

advice of legal counsel, John W. Call, appellant further filed an
appeal of the judgement on or about August 30, 1990.

This action

was not necessary, but unknown to the appellant, because a timely
motion under Rule 59 terminates the running of the time for appeal
of a judgement, and does not begin to run again until the order
granting or denying such a motion is entered.

Hume v. Small Claims

Court of Murray City, Utah, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979).

Appellant's

motion for a new trial was denied on September 29, 1990.

The

appeal did not go forward at that time because the United States
Bankruptcy Court for Dallas, Texas, issued an automatic stay on
further proceedings against the appellees pursuant to 11 U.S.C
§ 362, dated October 24, 1990.
The granting of a new trial should never be merely capricious
and arbitrary; but should be ordered only when sound judicial
discretion, in the interest of doing justice between the parties,
so requires.

A decision of the trial court in this matter is a

matter for review on the theory of abuse of discretion on appeal,
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when appellant has made a showing of at least one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (a) of the rule. Crellin v. Thomas,
247 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1952), and

Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v.

Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952);

Thorley v. Kolob Fish &

Game Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962);
551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976);

Smith v. Shreeve,

Moon Lake Ele. Assn. v. Ultrasystems W.

Constructors, Inc., 765 P.2d 125 (Utah C.A. 1988);

Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah C.A. 1989).
In the appellants motion, he argued that it was not illness
alone that caused accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against, and that his motion had merit
under law in the interest of doing justice between the parties.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952).
Appellant cited prior illness, and incapacitation as attested
to by his apartment manager, Puyol Bang.

This is the same party

to whom appellant refered when a notice was given to opposing
counsel in June 1990 [See Appendix E].

In addition, a statement

from appellants physician, previously provided to opposing counsel
in response to his discovery request corroborated the contentions
of appellant of incapacitation, although the physician would make
no specific averments

[See Appendix J ] .

Appellant suffered from a chronic, debilitating condition and
did not seek treatment after his recovery on July 16, 1990.

His

affidavit and averments of the circumstances are creditable under
Rule 602 and 701, U.R.E. barring objections for cause by appellees.
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To the best knowledge of the appellant, and his recollections of
the proceedings, the appellees made no objections to the court
which were deemed creditable, because the trial court denied the
appellees Motion to Quash/Strike the appellants motion for a new
trial.

That is, appellant believes, to his best knowledge, that

appellees Motion to Strike did not raise objections to either the
sufficiency of evidence to support appellants motion or show the
impeachability of supporting testimony of Dr. Lowry and Puyol Bang.
Appellant contends that his illness, incapacity stemming from
that illness as demonstrated by medical hstory and testimony of
appellant's physician, the lack of means to make notice to the
appellees and court of incapacity on the date of trial because
telephone service had been disconnected, and prior notices given
to the court and opposing counsel [See Appendix H] of potential
problems resulting from appellants disability and offering a
solution and point of contact through Puyol and Melanie Bang, all
mitigate for a finding of surprise, inadvertence or excusable
neglect.

[See also Appendix E and J ] .

Even though defense counsel asserts that Rule 59(a)(3),
U.R.C.P. is usually construed as requiring accident or surprise
at trial, appellant would contend that the principle is equally
valid when applied to the situation under appeal where the matter
of appellant's non appearance is caused by accident or surprise.
Further, under Rule 201, U.R.E. judicial notice should have
been made of previous pleadings (i.e. motions for sanctions), and
other papers alluding to misconduct by opposing counsel, and for
the sake of justice and equity considering the past aggressiveness
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and apparent desire to prosecute appellants claim, taking all
facts into consideration it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court not to grant a new trial under the circumstances to
the appellant.
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. states in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with and advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, ... The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions,
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the grounds for its decisions on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than
one ground.
No written findings were made, and only an journal minute
entry of oral decision to deny appellant!s motion for a new trial
was ever received.

The rule and case law require that the facts

be stated specially and conclusions of law be entered separately.
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah C.A. 1989); Martindale v. Adams,
777 P.2d 514 (Utah C.A. 1989).
Because appellant is unable to prosecute the original claim
against the appellees at the present time for reasons of poverty,
distance from Utah, and disability, appellant seeks a finding on
this issue in the event that circumstances should change in the
near future, and for precedential value.

Copy of note made is not dated, therefore, appellant can
not state with certainty when sent, except a notice that
dicovery documents were sent to opposing counsel was filed
with the Clerk of Courts as required under the rules.
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Questions for Review: Part III

3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by
granting a judgement to the appellees when
two motions for sanctions against the appellees'
counsel under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. were still
pending and unresolved at the time of the trial?

Contrary to the assertions of opposing counsel, the grounds
that were cited by appellant as material and germane to this
appeal formed the core of the same argument for the imposition of
sanctions against appellees' counsel, Mr. T. J. Tsakalos #3289.
The principle argument for sanctions was the deliberate misrepresentation of facts and other distortions that appellant alleged
were made in bad faith and interposed for improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.

Whether specific conduct amounts to a

violation of this rule is a question of law for the trial court to
render a decision thereon.
163 (Utah C.A. 1989).

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d

To avoid, slight, or ignore appellants most

serious concerns is an abuse of discretion.
This assertion is even more apparent when viewed with the
consideration that the judgement rendered in favor of the appellees
was wholly reached on a finding of "bad faith" on the part of the
appellant under the same rule.

Appellant would contend that under

Rule 201, U.R.E. judicial notice should have been made of allegations by appellant of "bad faith" by the opposing counsel, and
therefore, should have been addressed and resolved prior to any
finding against appellant, and judgement entered therefrom.
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It is simply inappropriate, and unjust to the appellant, to
merely presume that his allegations or concerns lack credibility
simply because he lacks formal legal training, or acts in the
matter before the court pro se because his poverty prevents the
hire of an attorney.

It is equally inappropriate, and unjust to

the appellant, to presume greater credibility to opposing counsel
merely because he is an attorney at law.

Federal and state law

provide that impecunious litigants shall have equal access to the
courts.

Appellant contends that equal access is effectively denied

when the trial court imposes an onus or bias against poor litigants,
2
or those that proceed pro se.
Precisely because such persons lack
formal legal training, greater latitude is and should be granted to
harmless errors committed by such persons; the same latitude is not
appropriate to attorneys whose training and experience lend themselves to presentation of appellees defenses.
In the motions for sanctions, and other pleadings before the
court, the appellant complained of several actions by opposing
counsel which appellant held to be improper, harassing, and
intended solely to increase costs of litigation.
offered.

Two examples are

When appellant initiated litigations against the

appellees, service of summons required three separate requirements.
The title of the case was captioned as required under Rule 3(a) and
Rule 8(f), U.R.C.P. in order to give fair notice of the nature and
basis for the litigations, and the type of litigation, to all the
defendants being brought into the cause of action; variance between
-36-

title of the summons and the title of the complaint was not
required in order to show separate requirements under the Rules
and statutes for personal service.

Bawden & Associates v. Smith,

624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981); Blackham v. Snelqrove, 3 Utah 2d 157,
280 P.2d 453 (1955).

Appellant made personal service on two

defendants, Southland Corportation and 7-11 Stores, under the
provisions of Rule 4(d), U.R.C.P.

Separate service was required

by statute under different circumstances.

Personal service upon

the state insurance commissioner pursuant to § 31A-2-310, U.A.C.
was required for defendant Kemper Group; and personal service
upon the director of business regulations pursuant to § 16-10-13,
U.A.C. was required for defendant Citgo Petroleum Corporation.
Opposing counsel prematurely filed a Motion to Quash service of
process, and further cited within the motion appellants failure
to comply with a statute that did not exist: §41A-2-3.

Appellant

failed to comprehend that counsel had miscited § 31A-2-310, and
because counsel was an attorney, presumed he complained of some
requirement that appellants legal research may have overlooked.
Both actions, required additional time at the University of Utah
Law Library in order to ascertain what failure of appellant was
complained, and the filing of additonal pleadings in the form of
objections, and a motion for a more definate statement.
Secondly, discovery as required under the appellantfs motion
to compel discovery affirmed by the trial court had not been
completed, and certain motions, including the appellant's motions
for sanctions under Rule 11, were still pending before the court,
-37-

when appellees' counsel certified to the trial court readiness for
trial.

Rule 11, U.R.C.P. assert that Mr. Tsakalos' signature on

this pleading consistuted by him that he had read the pleading and
that is was correct.

Counsel knew that the aforesaid items were

deficient, and that the case was not ready for trial at that time
when he signed the certification to that effect.
Appellant contends that these facts support a finding that the
trail court abused its discretion by not ruling on the Motion for
Sanctions under Rule 11 prior to granting a judgement to the
appellees against the appellant for reasons of "bad faith", when
"bad faith" constituted the same grounds for relief as claimed in
appellant's motion.

In a previous matter before Judge Grant, the appellant was
the defendant in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Barron,
870901165-CV, and in this case had also sought the advice
of legal counsel, John W. Call, prior to asserting his
defense in the matter acting pro se. Upon legal advice, the
appellant argued on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction,
and offered in testimony and evidence those items suggested
by the appellant's counsel. Without any foundation for the
remark, Judge Grant after ruling against appellant told the
appellant that he should seek legal counsel to defend an
action in court. In the appellant's mind, and opinion
formed that Judge Grant did not rule as he did based on the
sufficiency of the argument or evidence, but because of a
bias against the appellant solely because he acted due to
his poverty pro se in defending the action, and was opposed
by an attorney at law. [The presumption seemed an extention
of legal principle in Larrabee v. Turner, where a police
officer's testimony has greater credibility that the citizen,
to the credibility of an attorney at law vs. a lay citizen*
which was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in the matter of
Barron v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 109 S.Ct. 1961, 3204 (1988).]
Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that the issues before the court are
matters of substance and merit directly related to the public's
perception of justice and fair play.

If a practicing attorney

at law can deliberately misrepresent and distort material facts,
utter total falsehoods (as was the case with appellees' counsel
assertions in the matter of Barron v. Dr. Thomas M. Kelly, H.D.
et al.), or represent circumstances in a manner inconsistent
with acceptable ethics, and escape penalty or censure, then
justice and equity are not served.
Appellant contends that relief from the judgement imposed by
the trial court should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),(3),
and (7), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because substantial
justice to the appellant demands such a course.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the
judgement to the appellees, erred in not ruling on the appellant's
Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11 against defense counsel, erred
in not granting appellant a new trial.

Appellant requests a

favorable affirmation of these contentions.
Appellant also seeks a favorable affirmation of the points of
law brought in issue and support of the findings above, specifically, that appellant as an impecunious litigant acting pro se
- and others so situated - are entitled to substantial access to
justice in state courts with an equal footing with lawyers, and
due sufficient latitude that would entitle relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of a claim without the
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burden of exceptional forms or other requirements that could be
expected of lawyers, as long as they can be construed to do
substantial justice under Rule 8(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Secondly, that illness with other mitigating circum-

stances is sufficient to extend or afford the protections of
Rule 59(a) and Rule 60(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
to the appellant.

Further, that the preponderous of evidence, or

evidence which would demonstrate to a reasonable person that one
of the conditions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. had been met, is
sufficient for favorable affirmation of a motion made by the
appellant under Rule 60.

Additionally, appellant seeks affirma-

tion that the common law of the land includes principles and
ideas that are unique to the American experience, and embodied in
extention of English Common Law, which should be known as American
common law.

And finally, appellant seeks an affirmation that the

appellant acted in good faith on what his belief was formed after
reasonable inquiry that the action was well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law, or good faith argument for extention,
modification or reversal of existing law.
DATED this

Z^

th day of

^yJb~y

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JRjf
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1991.

MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Pursuant to Rule 29(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, appellant in this matter requests that oral arguments in this matter be waived after briefing is completed by
all parties.
Appellant currently resides with family in the State of
Ohio.

Appellant suffers from multiple disabilities, and has

only a federal disability annuity of $477 per month to live
upon, and for the appellant to return to the State of Utah for
oral arguments in this matter would create a severe hardship.
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests that this
matter be decided upon arguments contained in the parties
briefs and the record on appeal.
Dated this 26th day of July, 1991.

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, J&'.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

William P. Barron, Jr.
Acting as Attorney Pro Se
11475 Holiday Way
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368
[513] 393-3925 or 372-2744
1/ William Paul Barron, Jr., certify that on the
day of

\xjJt'y/y

37

th

/ 1991, that I served a copy of the attached

Brief of M:he Appellant upon T. J. Tsakalos, Esq., the counsel for
the appellees in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class
mail with sufficient postage prepaid tot he following address:

T. J. Tsakalos #3289
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for the Defendants
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970
(801)

363-7611

W/jLt
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, ,krR.
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ADDENDUM

Title of Appendix
Pre-Litigation Legal Research
Barron v. Dr. Kelly, MP, et al
Pre-Litigation Correspondence
Transcript of Trial, July 16, 1990
Supporting Documents, New Trial Motion
Pre-Litigation & Discovery Evidence
Other Barron Litigation
Memorandum to Appellees1 Counsel
Memorandum to Trial Court
Medical Evidence & Discovery
Determinative Provisions of Law
[Verbatim]
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APPENDIX A
PI^E-LITIGATION LEGAL RESEARCH

APPENDIX A

STATfcMEMT OF CASE SPtftKY

1.

MATERIAL FACTS:

Accident occurred in Provo Utah at 7-11 Store at 1200 West and Columbia
Avenue on night of March 26-27, 1989 at 1230 AM [0030 Hours]. Projection in
the roadway 23" from pump (no other station situated in like manner in either
Utah or Colorado, which have the post on the pump island, not the roadway).
Son, Donald Hopkins in front seat and a witness. He did not see post either
as it was obscured late at night, poor lighting, same color as background.
[See letter to John W. Call, Attomey-at-Law, dated Sep. 2, 1990, follows.]
2.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
Tort Action based upon Joseph v. Hustad Corporation, 454 P.2d 916-918
A.

Existence of a Legal Duty:

§ 76-10-801 and 76-10-803 proscribe that nuisances which renders
a highway or street unsafe for passage for 3 or more people [I, Donny, Jessica
and Tanya in car], or insecure in life or use of property is prohibited.
B.

Breach of Duty—Negligence:

Post 23" from pumps in highway. Post painted black, background
indued black lightpole in line-of-sight from plaintiff's approach and darkgreen colored pumps, no reflectorization, poor lighting.
Co-ercion, threat:
Dennis Opl characterized plaintiff's claim as frivolous, and would
seek "bad faith" award of attorney fees per § 78-27-56 U.A.C. Would not
respond to claim made on March 29, 1989 until September-1989. [See letters
dated Nov. 2, 1989 and Nov. 4, 1989 by plaintiff, follows.]
C.

Damages as a Proximate Result:

Damages due to automobile accident. Mental Pain and Anguish due
to stress and resulting effects on health.
3.

AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF:

§ 76-10-808 U.A.C. allowed civil action against defendant who maintained
a nuisance to recover damages.

APPENDIX A
PRE-LITIGATION LEGAL RESEARCH
1.

TORT
A,
B.
3.

- 3 elements
Existence of legal duty from defendant to plaintiff
Breach of duty
Damage as a proximate result

Joseph v. Hustad Corp., 454 P.2d 916-918
either:

- direct invasion of some legal right
- infraction of some public duty by which special damages occurs
- violation of some private obligation by which like damages occurs
Tortfeasor- wrongdoer
liability, negligence
Palsgraph doctrine - one who is negligent is liable only for the harm or
injury which is within the orbit of foreseability and not for every injury
which follows from his negligence. N/A under Utah law per John Call, Attorney.
2.

STATUTES, UTAH ANNOTATED CODE
§ 41-6-32

Upon collision with other property, give notice to owner.

§ 41-6-114

Injurious materials (trash) on highways. [N/A]

§ 76-10-801 Nuisannce (1) .. anything, item, manner, condition whatsoever
that is dangerous to human life or health
§ 76-10-803 Public nusiance (1) omitting to perform any duty, which
ommission either annoys, injuries, or endangers the
comfort, repose, health or safty of three or more persons, or
unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tend to obstruct,
or renders dangerous for passage any .. street, highway, or
in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or
the use of property.
§ 76-10-808 Civil remedy for relief.
§ 31A-3-105 Presumption of jurisdiction (1) any insurer which provides
coverage of a business activity conducted in this state is
subject to the juris of the Insurance Commissioner and the
courts under 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310.
§ 31A-2-310 Summons issued by Insurance Conmissioner.
§ 16-10-13

Service of process to registered agent, Division Director
Dept. of Business Regulation as agents for receipt of
service (2) whenever a corporation fails to appoint or maintain a Registered agent, Director, Division of Corp. Com.
Code is the agent upon whan any process, notice or demand may
be served (two copies) [See also § 16-10-111(2) for service
of process on foreign copp. (i.e. out-of-state).
§ 16-10-111 Service as above.
§ 16-10-125 Sets fees for above @ $10.00
Insurance Commissioner: Harold Yancey, 160 E. 300 S., SLC
Director: Peter Van Alystne, 160 E. 300 S., SLC
§ 78-27-56

In civil actions ... the court may award reasonable .. fees
.. if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not broughtor asserted in good
faith.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A: LEGAL RESEARCH
Standards of Review, by Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis
KF 4575 C48 1986 2 Vols.
§5.2

Material Fact: (Rule 56C)(Substansive test)

On review of a summary judgement, we do as the D.C. was
required to do. We determine whether the record as it stands
reveals any disputed issue of material fact, assume the resolution of any such issue in favor of the non-movant, and
determine whether the movant is then entitled to judgement as
a matter of law.
First jersey National Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd.
723 F.2d 335, 338 (3rd Cir. 1983)
§5.6

Abuse of Discretion:
Clearly Erroneous Standard:

Joseph v. St. Charles Parish School, 736 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984)
Calderera v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983)
Rule 60(b) Order relief from a judgement or order on grounds
of mistake, excusable neglect to'fraud or general fairness.
Plain Error/Manifest Miscarriage of Justice:
Clearly erroneous: based on substantial error, erroneous view
of the law.
Abuse of discretion: a decision that is manifestly unreasonable,
illogical, or not supported by the evidence; clearly erroneous or unjust.
De Novo: Anew, over again; a second time
De Novo trial: trying a case again as if the first trial had
not taken place.
CASE LAW, STARE DECISIS:
247 P.2d 264
Crellin v. Thomas:
Discretion is reposed in TC to grant or deny motion for
new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence... reviewed
as Abuse of Discretion.
260 P.2d 741
Warrent v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al; Allowance of vacation of
judgement is a creature of equity designed to relieve against
the harshness of enforcing a judgement resulting from ...
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes preventing
presentation of claim or defense. .Review as Abuse of Discretion. Excusable neglect, illness and notice given the other
party.

APPENDIX A
375 P.2d 28
Kettner v. Snow: Motion must be made within 10 days. Discretion in granting new trial and relief from judgement within a
reasonable time, not to exceed 3 months.
590 P.2d 309
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, Utah: timely
motion for new trial terminates running time of appeal. Does
not run again until such order or motion is entered.
684 P.2d 52
Larsen v. Collins: Abuse of discretion review of motion to
set aside default judgement; TC discretion whether movant has
shown mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect.
765 P.2d 124
NA
776 P.2d 84
Schindler v. Schindler: must demonstrate evidence is insufficient to support findings or otherwise clearly erroneous.

APPENDIX B

Barron v. Dr. Kelly, M.D. et al.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
BARRON, WILLIAM PAUL JR
PLAINTIFF
VS
KELLY, THOMAS M
LDS HOSPITAL INC

CASE NUMBER 890906515 CV
DATE 05/08/91
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK MPB

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY. GILSON, JAMES W.

BASED ON REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO THE COURT'S ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE, THE COURT ORDERS THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

APPENDIX C

PRE-LITIGATION CORRESPONDENCE

KEITIPER

nanonai
p&c

companies

1

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company • American Motorists Insurance Company
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company • American Protection Insurance Company
Post Office Box 5347, Denver CO 80217 • 303 1696-1441 FAX 303)745-9481
October 17, 1989

William Paul Barron, Jr.
Vista Park Apartments, No. 14
611 Park Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332
Re:

Our Insured:
Our Claim No.:
Date of Loss:

The Southland Corporation
717 LN 021493 N
March 27, 1989

Dear Mr. Barron:
We are in receipt of your correspondence to The Southland Corporation
dated September 11, 1989, whereby you have provided them with your
Affidavit and a diagram of the accident scene at the 7-Eleven Store
in question.
As I thought I explained to you in our conversation of September 6,
1989, we are the liabili-ty carrier for The Southland Corporation and,
therefore, if you have any questions in regard to your claim, they
should be directed to us.
Therefore, at this time I would ask that all future correspondence
come to my attention.
I have once again taken the opportunity to review your claim in order
to determine if there is any liability on the part of The Southland
Corporation.
As an operator of a motor vehicle, you are under a high duty of care
to maintain a proper lookout at all times while operating a motor
vehicle. It is, therefore, our position that you failed to maintain
a proper lookout in that you had a collision with a stationary object.
Therefore, since it appears that you were more than 50% responsible
for the collision, we will be unable to offer you any type of settlement
in regard to the damage to your motor vehicle.
If you have any questions regarding our decision, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Very truly yours,
On behalf of
NATIONAL LOSS CONTROL SERVICE CORPORATION

Dennis Opl
Claim Representative

'

William Paul Barron, Jr.
October 17, 1989
Page 2

cc:

The Southland Corporation
7-Eleven Stores
Districts 1851 and 1852
5288 South 320 West, Suite B-158
Murray, Utah 84107
Attention:

Allen Pack
Market Manager
South Utah - 1852

October 21, 1989
Dennis Opl
Claim Representative
National Loss Control Service Corp.
P.O. Box 5347
Denver CO 80217

Dear Mr. Opl;

You explained in your conversation of September 6, 1989, that you were
the liability carrier; however, you failed to provide a means to contact
you. Further, you never responded, according to Utah Law, to my claim for
damages in writing.
Secondly, Utah law provides for a legal means against persons who obstruct
movement of traffic in a manner calculated to induce injury or property damage.
Therefore, please be advise of the attached lawsuit for violation Utah Annotated
Code, § 76-10-801(1), and § 76-10-803(1)(a) and (c) inter alia.
Sincerely yours,

William P. Barron, Jr.
611 Park St., Apt. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
1 Tncl:
as
cc:
Allan Pack
Southland Corp.

KEmPER

nanonaL
PiC

companiEs
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company • American Motorists Insurance Company
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company • American Protection Insurance Company
PostOffice Box 5347, Denver CO 80217 • 303 j 696-1441 FAX 303 J745-9481

November

2,

1989

William Paul Barron, Jr.
Vista Park Apartments, No. 14
611 Park Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332
Re:

Our Insured:
Our Claim No.:
Date of Loss:

The Southland Corporation
717 LN 021493 N
March 27, 1989

Dear Mr. Barron:
This letter will inform you that we are in receipt of your proposed
suit against our insured.
We are also in receipt of the photographs that you took on
September 10, 1989, of the accident location. I also have
photographs of the area as well as a diagram which gives us precise
measurements of the parking lot.
It is still our contention that our insured is not in any way liable
for the damage which you sustained to your vehicle. I believe the
pictures make it obvious that you were not maintaining the proper
lookout when you drove into the cement poles which surround the gas
island.
I am forwarding the draft of your proposed suit to our defense firm
and have asked that they defend the various defendants in the event
that you actually go through with your litigation.
It would appear that, based on my investigation, many of the various
counts which you are alleging in your suit are frivolous and,
therefore, we will be asking our attorneys to file the necessary
motion so that we can collect our defense costs.
Very truly yours,
On behalf of
NATIONAL LOSS CONTROL SERVICE CORPORATION

Dennis Opl
Claim Representative
DO/jb

November 4, 1989

Dennis Opl
Claim Representative
NATIONAL LOSS CONTROL SERVICE CORPORATION
Kemper National P & C Companies
P.O. Box 5347
Denver CO 80217

Dear Mr. Opl,

By now you should be aware that formal litigation has commenced in the
Third Judicial Circuit Court for the State of Utah against you and other
defendants in this matter. Enclosed herein, or under separate cover, you
will also find a subpeona duces tecum.
As a former investigator for the United States Government, I firmly
believe that your process of investigation, or deductive reasoning are
seriously flawed.
If you look closely at the photographs, from the driving
angle, they are nearly indistinguishable against the light poles in the pump
island - as they as essentially the same color.
What is obvious - to any reasonable and competent person - is that any
driver, unfamiliar with the station or the area, approaching the pump island
from that angle on a dark, moonless night, would be unable to see a black
post, against dark green pumps and black light post, even with maintaining
the proper lookout.
As far as the threat of Rule 11 sanctions, bear in mind that you must
prove my suit to be knowingly frivolous, and brought "to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose,..." Therefore, we'll have to
let a judge and jury decide the merits of your frivolous arguments for
denying a just claim.
Sincerely yours,

I

William P. Barron, Jr.
6 H Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
cc:
John Call, Attorney-at-Law
Allan Pack, 7-11
Southland Corp.

APPENDIX D

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF JULY 16, 1990
BEFORE JUDGE PAUL G. GRANT
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL
1

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNT^C*/

2

7
6
9

JoJ

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.

to

fyIs

Case No. &faM9&A

Plaintiff,

5
6

V

-oOo-

3
4

EXHIBIT

CVO$

MOTION TO DISMIsJty Cfy

vs.
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION,
7-11 STORES, CITGO PETROLEUM
AND KEMPER GROUP,
Defendants.

>7K
J / "J
-oOo-

10
11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED that/on the 16th day of July, 1990,

13

the above-entitled matter came' on for hearing before the

14

Honorable Paul G. Grant, sitting as Judge in the above-named

15

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

16

proceedings were had.
-oOo-

17
18

APPEARANCES:

19

For the Plaintiff:

No appearance

20

For the Defendant:

MR. T. J. TSAKALOS
Attorney at Law
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah

21
22
23
24
25

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

8.4180

1

he sued Charter Summit Hospital and several people and that--

2

pro se, and that has been dismissed.

3

Midvale City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed.

4

October 31 of '89, he sued the State of California and the

5

California Department of Food & Agriculture, 'cause they stopped

6

him at the border, wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and

7

vegetables.

8

Court.

9

has been dismissed.

On June 25, f89, he sued
On

That was dismissed in the United States District

On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit again and that

10

November 16, '89, he sued the State of Utah and the

11

Utah State Tax Commission for his taxes.

12

been dismissed, and then he sued us v/hen our pumps did not get

13

out of his way, and now has not appeared.

14
15

THE COURT:

And your claim for attorney ls fees is how

I much?

16

MR. TSAKALOS:

17 I

THE COURT:

18
19

I think that one has

I will prepare an affidavit.

All right.

If you'll send that with the

judgment.
\

20 J

MR. TSAKALOS:

Thank you, your Honor,

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

21
22 I

* * *

23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.
VS.
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION was electronically recorded by the
THIRD
Circuit Court,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Utah.
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth in said cause.
That the said testimony of said witnesses was electronically
recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into
type writing, and that a true, and correct transcription of
said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the
foregoing pages numbered from 2
to 3
, inclusive
and said witnesses testified and said as in the foregoing
annexed testimony.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah,
this
29 day of
MAY
, 19 91 .
.

..

i
V^KI
res:

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

frer

APPENDIX E

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se
611 South Park Street, Apt. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
SOOTHLAND CORPORATION, 7-11 STORES,
KEMPER GROUP, CITGO PETROLEUM CORP.

Civil No. 893010924-CV
Judge Paul Grant

Defendants,

STATE OF UTAH

)

: SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(a)(3) and 59(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff hereby offers under oath the following reasons
for requesting a new trial for accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
1.

Due to the poverty of the Plaintiff, and his inability to pay for

services, his telephone service was disconnected on June 19, 1990.
2.

Due to the multiple disabilities which the Plaintiff suffers, which

includes a heart condition Mitral Valve Prolapse Syndrome, Plaintiff was ill
on Monday, July 16, 1990, and incapacitated by his illness,
3.

Further, because Plaintiff did not have telephone service, he was

neither able to summon assistance, nor advise the court or the Defendants of
his inability to proceed on the trial date originally set.
Dated this 19th day of July, 1990

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR

Sworn to and subscribed before me, a Notary Public, this 19th day of July,
1990.
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EXHIBIT

A-F-F-I-D-A-V-I-T
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS:
SALT LAKE COUNTY)

I, Puyol Bang, Manager of the Vista Park Apartments at 607-611 South
540 East (Park Street), Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, have been acquainted
with William Barron since May 1990, when my wife and I became the new
resident managers.
During that time, I have observed Mr. Barron become weak and ill on
several occassions. Also, on several occassions I have checked on him in
his apartment when he would be helping me, and find that he had collapsed
on the floor and unable to stand-up.
Also, on July 21, 1990, Mr. Barron was found on the sidewalk in front
of the apartment complex, and was transported by ambulance to LDS Hospital
Mr. Barron seems to have good days when he is able to render assistanc
to me by watering the lawn, picking up trash, or sweeping; and other days
when he looks and acts ill, or after working a short while begins to stumb!
and needed assistance back to his apartment.
On Monday, July 16, 1990, he did not come out of his apartment until
in the early evening, and had been ill the night before. This was not an
uncommon occurrance, and no particular alarm was attached to his absence.
Dated this 1st Day of August, 1990.

-1-

Subscribed and sworn to before me, A Notary Public/ on this 1st day of
August, 1990, the aforesaid Affidavit of Puyol Bang, 607 Park St. #15, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
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EXHIBIT

William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se
611 Park Street, Apt. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
(801) 364-5243

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIPCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.

:
AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, ET AL
Defendants,

:
:

Civil No. 893010924-CV

:

Judge Grant

INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions as fully as possible
and cited any medical rationale for the opinions stated herein.
1.

How long have you treated William Paul Barron, Jr.
a: I have treated Mr. Barron since January 28, 1987.

2.

What is the nature of the treatment, and diagnosis of Mr. Barron?
a. Mr. Barron's diagnoses are: (1) Major Depression, recurrent in remission.
(2) Dysthymia; and (3) M>tr«xValve prolapse. His treatment has included
^ antidepressant medication and individual psychotherapy,.
3. what has been the course of Mr. Barron's treatment (i.e. how well

has he responded to therapy), nature of remission and re-occurence, and
prognosis?
Mr. Barron has experienced waxing and waning synptoms of depression and
cardiac symptoms, all synptoms aggravated by stress, all synptoms with at best partial
response to treatment efforts. I expect that course to continue in the future.
4.

Has Mr. Barron ever been diagnosed with having conflict with

authority figures? If yes, specify.
Curing his course of treatment Mr. Barron
has repeated conflicts with enployers and other authorities.

5.

Has Mr. Barron ever been diagnosed with having a history of violent

behavior, suicidal ideation, or violent ideation?

If yes, specify nature and

target of behavior or ideation. Mr. Barron has experienced frequent episodes of suicidal
ideation and fantasies of doing violence to others, especially others in authority,
though I do not recall episodes of violent behavior during the past three years.

6.

In the aforesaid case Mr. Barron alleges mental anguish and suffering

by Defendant's denial of a claim for damages to his automobile. Mr. Barron
maintains that the denial by Kemper Insurance Group was improper/ and that in
the period from March 1989 to September 1989 while was waiting for a response,
that he suffered extreme stress. During the period from September 1989 to
October 1989, he suffered additional stress, anguish and suffering from a
psychological nature due to the negative dealings with the insurance company,
and with the defendants attorney thereafter. What is your medical opinion of
Mr. Barron's claims, and the medical rationale for that opinion.
Curing the months in guestion, Mr. Barron's synptoms waxed and waned. He experienced a variety of stressors during the time, and also underwent a change in his
antidepressant medication. While he was experiencing stress and suffering during
those months, it is inpossible for me to attribute any particular proportion of
that suffering to his negative dealings with the insurance company and with the
defendants attorney.
This statement consists of two pages, with

Q

pages addended with

continuation of answers to the aforesaid guestions.
Dated this

£_ th day of

YA(LL

LM-

/ 1990.

DR. MICHAEL R. vL0WRY,uMD.
Wasatch Canyons Professional Bldg.
5770 South 1500 West #110
Salt Lake City UT 84123
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before roe a Notary Public, this
l\QUi
, 1990, in Salt Lake City UTAH.
[SEAL]

U-

th day of

*t

%

W W M

NOTARY/ PUBLIC

-22.

APPENDIX F

PRE-LITIGATION EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY
MAPS, PHOTOS AND DIAGRAMS
PROVIDED TO APPELLEES' COUNSEL
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APPENDIX G
OTHER BARRON LITIGATION CITED
BY APPELLEES' COUNSEL IN TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
ARGUING FOR DISMISSAL ON BAD FAITH GROUNDS
Barron v. State of California et al
Barron v. Charter-Summit Hospital et al
Barron v. City of Midvale et al
Barron v. State of Utah and Utah Tax Commission

MAG
CLOSED
CONSOL
U.S. District Court
District of Utah (Central)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 89-CV-983
Barron v. Tracey, et al
Filed: 10/31/89
Assigned to: Judge J. Thomas Greene
Referred to: Judge Ronald N. Boyce
Demand: $0,000
Nature of Suit: 440
Lead Docket: None
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Dkt# in other court: None
Cause: 18:241 Conspiracy Against Citizen Rights
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.
plaintiff

William Paul Barron, Jr.
[COR LD NTC] [PRO SE]
611 South Park Street
Apt. #14
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-3333
801-364-5243

V.

M. E. TRACEY
defendant
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE INSPECTION
defendant
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
defendant
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Proceedings include all events.
2:89cv983
Barron v. Tracey, et al

MAG
CLOSED CONSOL

10/31/89 1

Complaint filed; assigned to Judge Greene (ba)
[Entry date 11/1/89]

10/31/89 2

Motion by William Paul Barron Jr., to proceed in forma
pauperis and order (ba) [Entry date 11/1/89]

11/16/89 3

Order of Reference re: 636(b)(1)(B) signed by JTG 11/16/89
(mp) [Entry date 11/28/89]

12/4/89

Case referred

—

to Judge Ronald N. Boyce (mp)

12/29/89 4

Notice of voluntary dismissal by pltf (mp)
[Entry date 1/2/90]

12/29/89

Case closed (mp) [Entry date

—

1/5/90]

1/19/90

8

Order, consolidating cases 89-C-983G and 89-C-1056S with
all further docketing to appear on 89-C-983 signed by RNB
1/19/90 (mp) [Entry date 6/19/90]

2/22/90

5

Report and Recommendations of Judge Ronald N. Boyce .
Objections to R and R due by 3/4/90 (Jul)
[Entry date 2/23/90]

3/1/90

6

Objections by William Paul Barron Jr. to R&R (mp)
[Entry date 3/2/90]

4/26/90

7

Memorandum Decision granting [5-1] report and
recommendations and pltf complt is dismissed
JTG (mp)

8/15/90

9

12/19/90 10

signed by

Memorandum Decision, pltf's Mot for Reconsideration be and
the same hereby is denied; dism of pltf's elms in federal
ct is w/o prej to pursuit of such elms in state court if
such elms can properly be asserted in a court of competent
jurisdiction signed by JTG 8/14/90; cciattys (ch)
[Entry date 8/16/90]
Notice of filing of commentary on case law
Barron Jr. (mr) [Entry date 12/20/90]
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by William Paul

•^H^n/tT OF ( j 7 , ^

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ti&Mll 912$Q
CENTRAL DIVISION

^ARKl'S B Zii^JPD „.

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.,
Case No.

Plaintiff,
vs.

89-C-983-G
and
89-C-1056 S

ORDER OF
CONSOLIDATION

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
et al.,
Defendants.

The plaintiff, William Paul Barron, Jr., filed suite in 89C-986G against the State of California and M.E. Tracy.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed the same substantive action in 89C-1056 S and added The California Department of Food and
Agriculture Inspection.

Since the actions involve common

questions of law and fact, therefore, in accordance with Rule 42,
r.R.C.P.,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above two actions 89-C-983 G
and 89-C-1056 S are hereby consolidated.

89-C-9831 G will be the

operative file.
DATED t h i s

. £•//-,

/'

J

January,
anuary , 1990
J.??U.

day o f iSaaaesabaBX^ XSt&B.
BY THE COURT:
1

/,

Ronald N. Boyce
V
United States Magistrate

O

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT >
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
THE STATES OF CALIFORNIA,
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAl
INSPECTION, AND INSPECTOR
M.E. TRACEY,

Civil NO. 89-C-983G

Defendants,

Plaintiff has submitted a document to this court which,
in essence, is a motion to reconsider this court's Memorandum
Decision and Order of April 23, 1990. The court has reviewed the
entire file and has determined that oral argument would not be of
material assistance to this court's determination.

Accordingly,

this court will render its decision on the basis of the existing
record.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant case involves a suit1 by William Paul
Barron, under the privileges and immunities clause of the

1

Originally there were two separate suits, 89-C-983G and 89-C-1056S. These cases were
consolidated on January 19, 1990.

Fourteenth Amendment, Title 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242 and 42 U.S.C. §
1981, 1982, and 1985(3).
In it's Memorandum Decision and Order of April 23, 1990
this court upheld the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint because (1) Suit in this
court against the State of California and the California
Department of Food and Agriculture is prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Suit against
M.E. Tracey may not be maintained in federal court because none
of the jurisdictional basis alleged are valid;2 (3) A Bivens type
of claim under the Fourteenth Amendment may not be maintained
against a state officer because Congress has provided a remedy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (not pleaded by plaintiff); and (4) Venue
for such a claim is not in this district under 28 U.S.C. §1391
(b).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's Basis for Reconsideration
Because of the apparent sincerity and earnestness of
plaintiff's petition, this court again will discuss the merits of
2

18 U.S.C. §241 and 242 are criminal statutes and do not provide a jurisdictional basis
for a civil claims in federal court; 42 U.S.C. §1981 protects blacks, minorities and other identifiable
classes of persons based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics from discrimination and grants them
equal rights under the law; 42 U.S.C. 1982 relates to the equal protection rights of minorities to
be treated the same as whites with reference to property; and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) involves certain
conspiracies, not involved in this claim, and requires a showing of racial or other class based
discrimination. None of these statutes constitute a proper basis for jurisdiction. There is no
allegation regarding race, minority status or class based discrimination.

2

plaintiff's claims.

Plaintifffs basis for reconsideration appear

to be: (1) U.C.A. 76-1-107 should provide a civil remedy for
violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242; (2) 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982,
1983, and 1985 apply, regardless of the case law, to everyone
without a showing of minority status or discrimination; (3) The
Constitution itself gives authority to the proposition that the
14th-16th amendments negate the 11th amendment; (4) The actions
of the inspector were clearly illegal; and (5) Service of process
was proper.
As to plaintiff's first objection, regardless of
whatever the effect of U.C.A. 76-1-1073 may be in state court,
sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 United States Code do not confer
jurisdiction in federal court.4
As to plaintiff's second objection, that 42 U.S.C.
1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 apply to his claims and to everyone
without a showing of minority status, regardless of contrary case

U.C.A. 76-1-107 provides in pertinent part:
(c) This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or
liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, impeachment , or other
remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil
action, administrative proceeding, or otherwise, regardless of
whether the conduct involved in the proceeding constitutes an
offense defined in this code.
4

See Christian Populist Party of Arkansas v. Secretary of State of Arkansas. 650 F. Supp.
1205 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1987); Garrison v. Newell 55 F.R.D. 550 (D.C. Va 1972).
3

law, this is simply not the law.

The law clearly requires a

showing of minority status or discrimination.5
As to plaintiff's third objection, that the
Constitution itself gives authority to the proposition that the
14th-16th amendments negate the 11th amendment, once again there
is no authority for this extreme and groundless proposition.
This court again rejects the argument.
As to plaintiff's fourth objection, that the actions of
the inspector were illegal, such is irrelevant because this
court's decision and the magistrate's decision were based on lack
of jurisdiction to pursue such a claim in federal court.
As to plaintiff's fifth objection, that service of
process was proper, such is irrelevant because this court's
decision and the magistrate's decision were based on lack of
jurisdiction and not failure of service of process.
Based upon the court's analysis,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration be and the same hereby is denied.

Dismissal of

plaintiff's claims in federal court is without prejudice to
pursuit of such claims in state court if such claims can properly
be asserted in a court of competent jurisdiction.

5

See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraii. _ U.S. _ , 107 S.Ct. 2022 (1987); City of
Memphis v. Greene. 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee. 637 F. 2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980).
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

August

Yt,

1990.

5MAS GREENE
tTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO:

5

ch
Unxted States District Court
for the
District of Utah
August 16, 1990
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re:

2:89-cv-00983

True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the
following:
William Paul Barron Jr.
611 South Park Street
Apt. #14
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-3333

w^^i^.i^ic*.

>•**, cy. ^' J*-* «Lii£*Uk£ C5> frtti•'*-•.-.CC iiws
D I S T R I C T COURT

AUG 9 3 26PM'89
THJfcf J.:.Y,C -\i DISTRICT

SALT ^ ^ O U J H B I f

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR., PRO SE
Vista Park Square Apartments #14
611 Park Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332
(801) 364-5243

BY

-jY

I -J-

'DEPUTY/CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.,
Plaintiff,

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

vs.

No. 890903923CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

CHARTER-SUMMIT HOSPITAL,
BARRY ADAMS, BRENDON (SURNAME
UNKNOWN), JERRY LARCHER, SCOTT
DAVIS, and DOES UNKNOWN,
Defendants.

William P. Barron, Jr., acting pro se, hereby voluntarily
dismisses with prejudice his Complaint in the above-entitled
action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
DATED t h i s

S)fsA~ d a y of

\*J^^

, 1989.

V,

ILLIAM P . BARRON, ESC.

/

AUG 1 1 1989
DAVID W. SLAGLE A2975
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
Eleventh Floor,
Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-9 000

By-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.,
-, . _ „
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
No. 890903923CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

CHARTER-SUMMIT HOSPITAL,
BARRY ADAMS, BRENDON (SURNAME
UNKNOWN), JERRY LARCHER, SCOTT
DAVIS, and DOES UNKNOWN,
Defendants.

It appearing to the Court that the plaintiff in the
above-captioned claim has filed a Voluntary Dismissal pursuant
to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and good
cause appearing therefor, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-captioned
case be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice,
the parties to bear their own costs.

day of August, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

7
HOMER F. WILKINSON
DISTRICT JUDGE
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT U K E COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
DATEj.
V A u . a , \QQ
TTTrw>fv^

-2-

r i i x o iMOTKiCT COURT

Third Judicial District

JAN 2 <t 1990
0^ SALT^Kc ow JNX*^/ I

ALLAN L. LARSON #A1896
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake city, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR.,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION, MOTION AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
THE CITY OF MIDVALE UTAH,
THE CITY OF MIDVALE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, OFFICERS WILLIAM
NILES, STRONG AND SGT. LLOYD,
AND DOES UNKNOWN,

Civil NO. 890903924
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

STIPULATION AND MOTION
The above-named plaintiff and defendants hereby stipulate
and move that plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint as
against said defendants be dismissed with prejudice, each of the
parties to bear their own costs incurred, said action having been
fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties.

Dated this

/%s day of

, 1990.

Vet'yUA,:*
^

U

William Paul Barron, Jr.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Attor

L. L a r s o n
for Defendants

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Stipulation and Motion, and good
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff1s Complaint and Amended Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own
costs incurred.
Dated th

day of

, 1990

Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge

26\ ALIA 1 <*715.003\p1 dg. smo

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF. UTAH.

June 7, 1991

APPBIDIX B-4/1

Hon. James K. Logan, Esq.
Circuit Court Justice
United States Court of Appeals
10th Circuit Court
1961 Stout Street
Denver CO 80294

Dear Sir:

I am writing in reference to your decision in Barron v. Utah and Utah
State Tax Commission, Case No. 90-4092, from the United States District Court
for the Central Division of the District of Utah, dated February 29, 1991.
The basis of your decision is that "Barron has not shown that an adequate
remedy is unavailable in the state courts."
I had originally intented to file an appeal with the United States Supreme
Court. The basis would be that (1) because of the Court's decision in the
Davis decision, Utah's claim for exemption from jurisdiction in federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 is lacking merit precisely because of the Davis decision,
or a good faith argument for a change, should the Court be inclined to uphold
the Defendants' position; and (2) that adequate remedy is lacking in Utah
State Courts for impecunious litigants.
With regard to the latter, and with reference to the aforesaid reasoning
in your decision, I would offer the following example. In 1988, I attempted
to initiate proceedings for malpractice and breach of fudiciary trust (i.e.
unauthorized disclosure of medical information and records) by a doctor.
Under Utah law, a prelitigation panel review by the Utah Department of Commerce,
Division of Professional & Occupational Licensing is required prior to initiating any claim for malpractice in Utah State Courts. Papers were prepared
and delivered to the appropriate agency as required under Rule 4 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure by a third party. For the next three years, repeated
attempts to procure the required panel review met with no sucess. I personally
made several appearances before Loretta Jiron, the panel review secretary;
and finally had a review scheduled in October 1990. On the day in question,
I was the only person to make an appearance; Ms. Jiron informed me that they
would need to re-schedule. History repeated itself, until on May 10, 1991,
the action was dismissed without prejudice by Judge Murphy.
I would submit that just because a remedy is proscribed and available
under Utah law in the state courts, if that remedy is not upheld both the
agencies charged with providing the remedy or recourse, then "adequate remedy
is unavailable in the state courts." State and federal law provide that
all citizens shall enjoy equal access to the courts and justice, not just
to those who can afford to procure the services of an attorney. Therefore,

Page 2. June 7, 1991
JUDGE LOGAN, 10th Circuit CA

APPHJDIX B-4/2

it logically follows that if the playing field is rendered level in this
regard, then higher courts must assure that all citizens are receiving equal
access and protection of the law, and that the lower courts and state agencies
are holding true to the duty imposed upon them by the people as expressed
by their agents, state and federal legislators.
I am not requesting a reconsideration. Since leaving Utah, I have neither
the health nor capacity to continue, and shall defer to the state case to
present these issues promulgated by the Davis decision in hopes that the
matter may again find a favorable hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Sincerely Yours,

William P. Barron, Jr.
11475 Holiday Way
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368
(513) 393-3925
cc:
1. R. Paul Van Damm, Utcih Attorney General
2.
Steven A. Trost, Utah Bar Association
3. Hon. Norman Bangerter, Governor, State of Utah
4.
Judge David Sam, U.S. District Court
5.
Judge J. Thomas Green, U.S. District Court

APPENDIX H

MEMORANDUM TO APPELLEES' COUNSEL

APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM TO TRIAL COURT

October 29, 1989
Hon. Judge Grant
Third Judicial Circuit Court
455 South 200 East, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Dear Sir;

I rechecked with the Secretary of State on two defendants in this matter,
Kemper Group and Citgo Petroleum. Both have no registered agents in Utah.
Kemper is the liability insurance carrier for the primary defendant: Southland
Corporation dba Seven-Eleven Food Stores. Southland has a marketing agreement
with Citgo, but Citgo itself, does not "technically" do business in Utah, and
voluntarily withdrew its registration some time ago.
Therefore, by my understanding of Rule 4(f)(2), mail service on Kemper
and Citgo is proper, and hence the attached motion. If service upon Southland,
as you suggested Friday, is effective service upon the other Defendants, then
all is well; if not, then would you consent to this ex parte motion for
alternative service upon Kemper and Citgo.
Sincerely yours,

William P. Barron, Jr.
611 Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332

July 19, 1990

T. J. Tsakalos #3289
HANSON, EPPERSON, & SMITH
4 Triad Center #500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

Dear Mr. Tsakalos,

In reading your judgement entry you noted that I had six cases in
state and federal court dismissed as logic for a bad faith filing.
I don't suppose that you informed Judge Grant which were dismissed
because of an out-of-court settlement, which are on appeal, and which were
dismissed without prejudice for jurisdictional issues.
Further, I don't suppose that you informed Judge Grant about the
cases which I won.
Sincerely yours,

William Paul Barron, Jr.
611 South Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
cc:
Judge Paul grant
2 Incl:
1. Affidavit
2. Motion for New Trial

July 31, 1990

Hon. Paul Grant, Judge
3rd Judicial Circuit Court
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City UT 84111
RE:

Barron v. Southland, Civil No. 893010924-CV
Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial by Defendants

Your Honor,

Under Rule 59(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a Reply Memorandum is
not ordinary to a Motion for New Trial; however, Mr. Tsakalos has so twisted
and distorted the facts again, that I can not in good conscience remain
silent.
A previous Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11, for prior abuse of
judicial process, was filed against Mr. Tsakalos, for his blatant misrepresentations in prior pleadingsFVwas never adjudicated by the Court. In one
pleading he referenced a failing on my part quoting the Utah Annotated Code
for a section that can not be found therein. Counsel for the Defendants is
merely carrying on the tradition previously encountered with the Defendant
Kemper Group themself. They procrastinate a reply to my claim for months,
then respond by threatening me with sanctions if I challenge their decision
in court. Throughout these proceedings Mr. Tsakalos has abused his privilege as an officer of the court by using inflamatory and scurrilous language
in his proceedings to attack my motives and manner of obtaining a redress of
grievances that the Defendants refuse to acknowledge.
His objections, to use his language, are self-serving. (1) If there
have been 55 "pleadings", Mr. Tsakalos is responsible for most. He has
frustrated attempted at discovery^ which the Court ruled against himj and my
ability to proceed with my grievance by legal trickery to shunt my claim out
of the system. (2) Counsel for the Defense was provided with my medical
evidence for the last 10 years or more, by actual documentation and summary,
by his discovery, specifically delineating my multiple disabilities and how
they affect my health. When forwarding last-minute evidence to him, I included
a note, which I believe he acknowledged in an earlier pleading, of my current
poor health. (3) The facts of the complaint are not so clear cut as Counsel
suggests, as he conviently failed to note that I struck a post 23" from the
gasoline island - not as he alleged (this time) the gasoline island; that the
post struck was painted brown and in front of a pole painted brown/black and
green gas pumps; and that the accident occurred at night. (4) As previously

noted in my affidavit for a new trial, I did not appear at the trial because
I was incapacitated by my condition, not to abuse or to frustrate the legal
system, or to harass the Defendants, but to garner a modicum of justice.
I have enclosed two affidavits in support of these statements. One, an
affidavit dated May 2, 1990 from my treating physician outlining the medical
disabilities and their effect upon me. Two, an affidavit authenticating a
computer enhanced photograph of the accident cite, showing the accident site
as it would have appeared on the night in question. As one can clearly see,
the small post struck is nearly invisible in front of the pole behind it and bear in mind that the enhancement was made from a daylight photograph.
Both of these affidavits were previously served upon the defendants counsel.
Not having access to a legal dictionary at the present, I am not sure
what Mr. Tsakalos is meaning when he states that my affidavit is "conclusory".
I was following Rule 8(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to be "simple,
consise and direct". Rule 59, U.R.C.P. did not specify or require evidenciary
memorandum to be submitted with the Affidavit. Further, counsel had sufficient
medical evidence previously gained through discovery to know of my disability
and its affect (and I believe callously took advantage of that fact, to engender
enough stress to produce just such an outcome).
If his objection is merely one for want of detail, it can be easily
remedied. Because of my heart condition, mitral valve prolapse, ^"frequently
suffer episodes of cardiac syncopy, i.e. my heart "flutters" from arrythmias,
and I collapse. [This has been documented for at least 10 years]. During the
attack and for several hours thereafter, I am weak and unable to walk or get
about. Certainly, it is impossible to walk or drive to the courthouse. I do
not have a phone, and haven't had since it was disconnected for inability to
pay on June 19, 1990. On the day of the trial, I had a syncopal episode in
my apartment, collapsed and was not able to move for several hours. T did not
have a phone, therefore, I could not call for assistance to get to a doctor, or
oxygen (which can alleviate the symptoms quickly; nor call the court, clerk, or
counsel until after I had recovered. During the preceding two weeks of the
trial date, I had been ill several times, which is why I wrote Mr. Tsakalos a
postit-note when remitting some last minute documents, so that he would be
aware of why I might be late (although I did not consider not being able to
attend, thinking it more liking collapsing in the courtroom, guaging the
previous experience with Mr. Tsalkalos.)
I regret the inconvience caused to the Court. I believe my complaint is
legitimate with a good basis in case law that I've read.
For Mr. Tsakalos to request "reimbursement as a condition precedent to
granting the motion for a new trial" is an unfair advantage of his position
of power. The Defendants, and by and thru counsel, have tried to intimidate
me from pressing a legitimate claim, and have continually harassed me with
lies and inuendos, and misrepresented facts, and threats of financial harm if
I presented a claim in Court. Such intimidation should not be allowed.

-2-

I will file Objections to Defendants Motion to Strike within ten (10)
days, and I hope to speak with my attorney again for advice in this matter.
However, due to my impecuniosity, I couldn't afford trial services, or
lengthy litigation costs. At the outset it seemed a simple procedure, file
the complaint and present evidence to establish one's testimony at a quickly
set date. I never dreamed of all the legal trickery and shenaigans that have
beset me since tangling with Mr. Tsakalos.
I have already repaired the damage to my vehicle, but the emotional
trauma is irreparable.
Sincerely yours,

William Paul Barron, Jr.
611 South Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332
2 Incl:
as

cc:
1.
2.

Counsel for Defendants, T.J. Tsakalos
John Call, Attorney-at-Law

611 South Park St. #14
Salt Lake City OT 84102-3332
September 23, 1990

T. J. Tsakalos #3289
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
4 Triad Center, Suite #500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970

In re: Barron v. Southland .Corporation, et al 893010924-CV

Dear Mr. Tsakalos,

When I graduated from Bowling Green State University in 1984 with a degree
in History, I considered myself, with a 3.85 grade point average, to be reasonably
intelligent. I took several courses in American Political Thought and Constitutional Law. My favorite case was Barron v. Baltimore (1833), as my forebearers
not only aided the patriot cause during the War for Independence, but thereafter
agitated for the rights thus gained for yeoman farmers, traders, merchants and
the common people.
Since I am acquainted with the not only the writings of Adams, Burke and
Locke, who our founding fathers studied when formulating our government, but also
those of Washington, Paine, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison and others who drew up
the blueprints of our political and legal system, I quite frankly consider myself
another compatriot of their works. As Abraham Lincoln said, we have a government
of the people, by the people, and for the people. Therefore, our constitution and
the English Common Law of our legal system is based upon that premise; and thereby,
under § 68-3-1, Utah Annotated Code, the law and the legal system rests upon the
premise of law of the people, by the people, and for the people.
Something, as Jan Thompson's articles in The Deseret News attest, is out of
sync with these principles. The Equal Access to Justice Act tries to address the
issue of access to the judicial system, but does nothing to address the basic
bias and injustice. For over 70 years, lawyers have predominated the legal system and the legislature that enacts the laws. Lawyers also are our judges. All
parties to a dispute are usually from the same background: counsel for plaintiff,
defendant, and the bench are lawyers. The system therefore, is stacked against
those who can not afford legal representation in the system; and in my personal
experience, Utah courts are extremely biased against anyone, who" by necessity or
choice, must act for themselves.
A case in point. Judge Grant was the jurist who presided in the matter
Continental Bank v. Barron & Barron (1988). Before proceeding, I spoke with my
attorney, John W. Call - HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN, & CALL, who reviewed the claim and
advised me that I had a case under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction; aided
me in defining the areas that I needed to research and study. I did this at the
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University of Utah Law Library, and proceeded in court by myself as I could not
afford John's services as a barrister. I believe I presented the facts in
court in line with the legal advise given in an intelligent and adequate manner.
I was shocked, but not surprised, after summations when Judge Grant ruled
against me then told me that I "should seek legal advice!"
Not stated, but surely apparent, was Judge Grant!s assumption and bias that
as a non-attorney, I didn't know what I was talking about; and the bias that only
attorneys should be in court, except small claims, which is not really a court
but a circus presided over by lawyers.
Case in point: Barron v. Pacific Management (1987). This was prosecuted
in small claims, and I did the legal research at the U. I won the case under
the doctrine of trespass to personality, but the judgement was only $80 against
a loss of $1,500-2,000 value of my car. The lawyer who presided, from what I
was told, had substantia] investment in real estate and stock holdings in a
property management firm, and should have recused. No appeal on the merits of
the judgement, mitigated against my $400/month disability payment, was possible
at the time.
Throughout the course of these proceedings I never expected an easy victory,
however, I did expect that professional ethics might have averted some of the
abuses I was subjected too.
1. You prepared the first certificate of readiness for trial that had
facts that were knowingly presented which were false.
2.
Judge Grant ignored entirely an earlier Motion for Sanctions for the
aforesaid insult, and denied a reguest for a More Definate Statement, when I
pursued the meaning of a pleading of yours to a reference to § 41A-2-3, U.A.C.
in a Motion to Quash as to Kemper Group. No such statute exists, according to
my own and staff research at the UNIVERSITH LAW LIBRARY.
3. You presented distorted information to justify a claim to "bad faith"
on my part.
Which cases did you justify to Judge Grant as indicative of "bad faith"
because they were dismissed? Not one had a finding of bad faith, to the contrary.
Were these among those presented:
a. Barron v. The State of Utah et al (USDC UT 1990) - The court held that
plaintiff was barred jurisdictionally under 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Plaintiff
appealed to 10th Circuit Court of Appeals arguing grant of jurisdiction
under 4 U.S.C. §111 and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan
(1989).
b. Barron v. Office of Personnel Management et al (USDC UT 1989) - Parties
had com? to agreement, and federal defendants agreed to waive collection
action. Plaintiff's claims were settled by other Defendants.
c. Barron v. State of California et al (USDC UT 1990) - The court dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Reconsidered "because of the apparent sincerity
and earnestness of plaintiff's petition", the court ordered "Dismissal of
Plaintiff's claims in federal court is without prejudice to pursuit of
such claims in state court if such claims can properly be asserted in a
court of competent jurisdiction."
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d. Barron v. The City of Midvale et al (DC UT 1990) - Stipulation, Motion
and order of Dismissal ... with prejudice, ... said action having been
fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties.
e. Barron v. (Barter-Summit Hospital et al (DC UT 1990) - Voluntary
Dismissal by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P. as said action
had been fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties.
f. Barron v. Salt Lake City, Utah (109 S.CRpts. 1968)- Certiori denied.
This is a technical loss because I made a mistake in the appeals process,
and delayed the filing to the U.S. Supreme Court. It was a moral victory,
however, because a direct result of this suit is the signs you now see by
the Clerk of Courts window concerning giving procedural advise. Also,
because of this suit and complaints generated therefrom, Hon. Maurice Jones
is a more pleasant and able juris based upon my recent observations.
A principle of my religion teaches that we must deal honestly with all men.
This is an article of faith that I ever endeavor to uphold. I do not undertake
legal action lightly. I research the matter at the University law library to
see what the case law and statutes relate aboutrayproblem, and I seek advice
from my Stake President, who is a competent attorney-at-Law from all indications,
as appropriate. I am keenly sensitive to injustice, having been exposed to enough
injustice in the 20 years since my return from the Vietnam War; but I never undertake an action in Bad Faith.
For the present, you may delight in your hallow victory. I sensed from
Mr. Opl at Kemper Group Insurance, from the very beginning, that this might happen.
He was adamant in the proposition that no one challenges the Insurance Company in
Court without an attorney and gets away with it. The precedent would be too
damaging to the business, right? After all, if an impecunious litigant acting
Pro se could initiate a lawsuit, overturn the insurance companies position, force
action to remove or ameliorate a road hazard and nuisance at a client business,
or perhaps set a new path in stare decisis, the precedent would overwhelm the
industry with other agrieved claimants who were bullied by a claims agent and
insurance company, right?
Well, it ain't over until itfs over, or until the fat lady sings, as the
old saying goes. It is a matter of justice and principle!! Or as Davy Crockett
said, "When you're right, act on it."
Sincerely Yours,

\j

William P. Barron, Jr.

/

cc:
Judge Grant
John W. Call, Attorney
Jan Thompson, The Deseret News

APPENDIX J

MEDICAL EVIDENCE PROVIDED UNDER DISCOVERY
TO APPELLEES' COUNSEL AND
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

WASATCH CANYONS HOSPITAL
5770 South 1500 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
J u l y 23, 1991

William P. Barron, Jr.
11475 Holiday Way
Hillsboro, OH 45133-9368
Dear Mr. Barron,
This is in response to your letter of July 2, in which you
asked for an opinion from me as to whether symptoms of mitral valve
prolapse can result in incapacitation and whether you actually
became incapacitated on July 16, 1990.
My records show that we visited on June 4 of that year and not
again until August 30. You wrote me a letter between those two
visits, on August 20. I do not find details regarding the incident
of July 16, 1990, in my notes or in your letter. They reflect that
you were under the care of Dr. Towner at that time for evaluation
of fatigue. At both of our visits you complained of a number of
depressive symptoms.
Your letter referred to occasional
"collapses" from "fatigue, angina, or migraine pains, or whatever
you cal1 it."
I do not consider myself an expert in mitral valve prolapse
and cannot provide an opinion as to whether or under what
circumstances it can result in incapacitation. I can say that
during your course of treatment under my supervision there were
many episodes of temporary incapacitation from depression and a
variety of physical symptoms including fatigue.
I hope this is of some assistance to you and hope that you are
doing wel1.
Sincerely,

Michael R. Lowry, M.D.

MRL/ps

July 2, 1991

Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD
Wasatch Canyons Professional bldg.
Suite 108
5770 South 1500 West
Salt Lake City UT 84123

Dear Dr. Lowry,

In preparing an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the opposing
counsel has complained that previous medical evidence is not sufficient
to establish my contention that on July 16, 1990, I was incapacitated
due to cardiac syncopy, migraine, or whatever caused the problems.
Would you provide me a statement as soon as possible [my brief must
be before the Court of Appeals no later than July 26, 1991].
Specifically, you letter must address the following issues:
(1) Whether the symptoms of this condition (mitral valve prolapse)
actually result in incapacitation? [I presume a summary of cardiac
problems such as syncopal episodes from MVP Syndrome, brought on by physical
or emotional problems, or other causes, results in incapacitation, how,
duration, etc.]
(2) Your opinion as to whether the appellant actually became incapacitated on the day of the hearing (July 16, 1990). Since I did not seek
medical treatment that day, and only broached the subject subsequent to
the event to you on a later day, I presume he seeks corroboration that if
I said I was out, and the apartment manager testified to several incidents,
that these opinions be medically assessed.
I am staying at my parents at the present and if you need further
information, please call (513) 393-3925.
Sincerely yours,

William P. Barron, Jr.
11475 Holiday Way
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368
cc:
T. J. Tsakalos, Attorney-at-Law

May 18, 1990

Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD
Wasatch Canyons Hospital
Professional Bldg., Suite #108
5770 South 1500 West
Salt Lake City UT 84123-5352

Dear Dr. Lowry,

I had a court hearing on Monday concerning the dispute with Dr. Kelly
and LDS Hospital and that unauthorized release of information. The hearing
left me unsettled as I was not able to function properly, and become depressed
afterwards.
The incidents were similar in the nature of my response, to wit:
1.
Before Judge Murphy, I froze and was not able to respond to the
situation, when the judge said that he was confused as to whether proper
procedures were taken based upon the papers filed. This was a surprise,
because each item was clearly irprked, and readable; it was written in mostly
plain english as I am not proficient in all the legal jargon. I was not
able to respond well after that, I was stuck on the notion that I was not
clear in my communication, for which I always recieved high praise and marks
for in college.
2.
A few weeks ago, another man and I backed into each other at a
Bank parking lot. He came out of his car, and verbally machine-gunned me
about how the accident was all my fault. I had only used my mirrors and
had not turned my head, but he was backing out as well. Then he began to
say how the police would cite me, and my insurance would go up $250/year,
etc., but he'd take $100 and forget the whole thing. I couldn't function
in the situation to defend myself, similar to the above.
3. When Ruth Ann and I were at the first custody hearing, Commissioner
Peuller said that my complaint over visitation rights was "the most flagrant
abuse of iudicial process she (sic) ever saw", etc. Afterwards, I was almost
unable to present my complaint, stumbling over words, etc.
I am not sure what is happening in these types of situation, except
that my thinking and organization prepared beforehand becomes scrambled,
and I don't function thereafter well. After this event has ended, T become
very depressed, then very angry, like someone used or abused me.
Sincerely,

William P. Barron, Jr.
611 Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332

May 13, 1990

Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD
Wasatch Canyons Hospital
Professional Bldg, Suite #108
5770 South 1500 West
Salt Lake City ITT 84123-5352

Doctor Lowry,

While I am lucid, T wanted to make you aware of my current situation and
condition. In the past two weeks, I have started to slide downwards. My
present condition is thus:
PHYSICAL:
1. My sleep has been somewhat erratic in the last two weeks; either I
toss and turn, or sleep 12 hours or more. If it gets worse, I thought about
taking \ tablet of klonopin (.5mg tabs) to get a little better sleep. [A full
tablet gives me a good rest, but 10-12 hours long; \ tab is good for 6-7 hours.]
2.
I wake-up with moderate to severe sciatic pain in my left leg, and
lower back. It generally eases after moving around for awhile.
3.
I experience angina-like pain at least once a day for the last two weeks.
This is usually associated with my walking the dog.
4.
I still suffer from chronic fatigue, and "muscle weakness" - or perhaps
better stated, a feeling of weakness in my leg muscles, like they won't support
my wieght. I experience an unsteady gait, and wobbliness during these periods.
Dr. Towner's exam last March reveal no evident physical cause. Again, exercise,
like walking the dog (which used to invigorate me, unless prolonged) will
produced this after just a few short blocks. Last fall, I was riding my bike
up to 3 miles a day, or walking for an hour before adverse effects were noticed.
5.
In the last two months, I have been having a severe headache about once
a week that last several hours, and usually is only relieved by sleeping. The
usual analgesics avail no relief. It feels like someone buried a hatchet into
the crown of my head, and many times I can feel a throbbing sensation deep in
my skull. A tension headache has always made my posterior neck and shoulder
muscles ache, so this is different from what I have usually experienced.
6.
I still have the "lightning flashes" in my head before going to sleep,
and upon waking; but now have them during the day, when I get yawning and
sluggish feelings with the fatigue.
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EMOTIONAL:
1.
I have been getting very depressed, more so as time goes by.
have been experiencing a lot more stress in the last few weeks.

But I

2.
My feelings range more in the area of the following now: hopelessness,
futility, isolation, etc.
3.
I have been walking on the razor's edge with anger the past week. T
received a denial onrayVA appeal; when I went into the VA to discuss the reasons
and rationale behind the decision, I got a little pissed-off, and threw some .45
caliber ammunition at the VA rep and told him what to do with them. [I thought
the police were after me later, while waling Sarah, as three or four cars were
erasing the neighborhood. But they weren't.] When I came home, I sequestered
myself in bed for a few days, until it was safe to venture outside again. While
locked in, I fought thoughts and feelings about improvising some munitions and
assaulting the Federal Bldg. or the Courthouse, but no one would take care of
Sarah, and with my polyuria, I couldn't hold hostages long enough unless it was
in the bathroom. Now I'm just depressed and numb.
STRESSORS:
1. Donald went back to juvenile detention last Tuesday. He stole some
money (my last $2.00), and disappeared all day. The week before he was almost
picked-up for drinking with an adult who had a case of beer and a bag of weed
that was being passed around several other youngsters. Then he stayed out all
night, and disappeared when he spent the weekend with his mother. When he got
out of DT, he grabbed me by the neck when I didn't give him the $50 of his
paycheck that I reimbused those he stole from. (He wanted to hold the money
while we went looking for shoes and clothes.)
2.
Tomorrow, Donny goes back to court for possession of tobacco when he
was picked up last week, and in the afternoon, I have a hearing on my dispute
with IDS Hospital and Dr. Kelly over an unauthorized letter he sent to DOL five
years ago.
3.
The VA denied my claim for service-connected disability from agent
orange and PTSD again, and my representative and I have to redo all the appeals
papers again to send to the Board of Appeals in Washington, D.C. Ruth Ann has
been nagging about letting her friend in the VFW take-over, and another friend
who supervises the VFW service officers, based in D . C , to pitch in too!
4.
Friday, I have a trial for a citation for incompetent driver. I loaned
my car to a neighbor, and her husband backed into another car. His license had
expired the week before on his birthday, so I was cited. (When I first let them
use the car in January, they both had out-of-state, but valid licenses.) Now
I could lose my driver's license, face a $300 fine, or have my insurance cancelled.
[And ever since the Prosecutor's office lost the case when I appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court two years ago, they have been itching to get even.]
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5.
I'm still burning over my loss in U.S. District Court, to learn that
"every" and "all" in the Civil Rights Act only applies to blacks and minorities.
White is black, and black is white; it's crazy when the law doesn't mean what it
says in plain English. No wonder no ones trust the courts or government, like
Danny DeVito said, "Q^ What do you call 20,000 lawyers at the bottom of the
ocean. A^ A good beginning."
6.
Isolation. Lots of it. I don't have friends in the usual sense of
the word. No one calls or visits me on their own volition, except infrequently.
I usually go wandering among acquaintances, or calling the family long distance
when I need to talk with someone. I seldom socialize as I always feel like people
don't like having me around, because I stutter, or sound funny, or just ain't
charismatic or witty. I don't date; don't know anyone, or have the money to do
so even if I was inclined; and in our stake, we're an ignored bunch anyway. Even
Jessica doesn't call or come over; and Donny is out getting into trouble.
7.
Losing the battle with the kids. Donny is so up-and-down, I don't know
if he'll turn around or not. He picked up all my bad habits, and seems headed
for bigger trouble. Jessica hasn't been around or had much contact since Donny
has been here; she seems annoyed or embarassed of me around her yuppie friends,
except when they need a ride (I'm being too harsh here probably).
8.
A hundred little things everyday that grate like rocks in your shoes.
No wonder my memory is so bad anymore; forget fulness can be a blessing in
disquise, except I don't remember why I'm so down.
I don't understand why everything has went to seed so fast in the past few
weeks. Everytime I think that things are starting to pull out, I get hit with
a storm, and it all comes unraveled. If I feel in a better mood, I'm too tired
to do little projects like fix and put-together a bike (it's been in pieces for 3
months), or vice-versa. I get to where I seen to manage the everyday stuff, and
think I'm just about ready to hold my own again; then something happens and I
can't hold it together.
Is it the medication, or I am missing something? Bob Bennett and I barely
touched on survivor guilt, PTSD, and how conflict with authority may fit in, but
never explored much further. [More trying to change some behaviors than learning
how they came to be.] I'd go back to Dr. Towner, but I think he regards me strictly
as a "nut" or "hypochondriac" case. No reason for the polyuria (diabetes seems
ruled out); fatigue is pegged as mental; and heart symptoms are defined as mental,
not serious, non-existent, or the luck-of-the-draw, depending upon which doctor
I see.
When I was having problems last fall, Dr. Walsh ran some EKG's but never
informed me of the results. I got a report from Instacare on their EKG: abnormal
R progression, ....
I hope that after next week, some of the stress will lessen, and maybe I'll
start feeling better again, at least my mood. If you think I should change my
medication doseage, please give me a call.
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Unless I hear otherwise, I'll continue the prozac according to our last
discussion, and see you on June 4th, at 2:00 P.M.
Sincerely,

William P. Barron, Jr.
611 Park St. #14
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332

1 Incl:
as
cc:
Bishop Duane S. Smith
Dr. Kevin Walsh, MD [Intermountain Clinic]
Dr. Steven R. Towner, MD [Salt Lake Clinic]

AGENT ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM

Attending Physician's Statement
To be completed for every veteran applying for a disability payment.

i n
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Part A. Patient
(To be completed by the veteran)

^

C O ^

V —•

Patient's

BARRON, WILLIAM PAUL J R .

Name

(Last)
Address

(First)

Qnr

^

^

/2_/S_/2_N±/4_N3_/J_/^_/0_/

(Middle)

611 South Park St. #14,* S a l t Lake C i t y UT 84102
Street
City
State
ZIP

Birth Date /j_/23/_48
Mo. DayYr.

Are you presently receiving Social Security Disability Income Payments or Supplemental Security Income?

/ / yes fSZJ no

SSI

discontinued a f t e r awar* of CSA D i s a b i l i t y annuity

Federal C i v i l Service
Important: After you have completed Part A, send this form and the pre-addressed envelope from your Application Kit to your physician. Ask him or her to complete Part B of this Attending Physician's Statement as
soon as possible and return it to:
THE AGENT ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM
P.O. BOX 110
HARTFORD, CT 06104

I Part B. Physician Information * J ^
(To be completed by the veteran's (patient's) physician ONLY)
Notice to Physicians:
Your patient (the veteran named above) has filed an Application for Disability Payments under the AGENT
ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM. To qualify for payments, your patient must demonstrate 'total
disability" as defined by the Social Security Act.
In order to evaluate this veteran's application, we need information from you regarding the diagnosis, history,
present condition, and treatment of your patient's disability. We cannot begin that evaluation until we receive
this Attending Physician's Statement from you.
If your patient has answered "yes" above to indicate that he or she is receiving Social Security Disability
Income, you need only complete Section 1 - Diagnosis, and Section 11- Signature.
If your patient has answered " n o " above, please complete the entire inside of this form,
Sections 1-11.
If you have any questions while completing this form, please call the AGENT ORANGE VETERAN
PAYMENT PROGRAM toll-free at 1 (800) 225-4712.
After you have completed this Statement, please place it in the pre-addressed envelope your patient
should have provided you, and mail it as soon as possible to the address shown above.

Thank you.

'

Part B. (Continued)
Reminder: If your patient answered "yes" in Part A on the front cover, complete only Sections 1 and 11. If
your patient answered "no", complete all Sections.
1. DIAGNOSIS/DIAGNOSES
(a) When did you last examine the patient? lj4jJd$8J
Mo. Day Yr.

(b) Your diagnosis (including any complications)

y*lQ.(<y<Z O f f f i c ^ / o A /

(c) Subjective symptoms (describe the disease)

" ^ e K U f r d / * * t <M/GW

R€cuRR&JT

? <Wl*W*>MN

(d) Is condition due to accidental, self-inflicted or traumatic injury?
£</ no
/ / yes If "yes," describe the nature of the injury

2. HISTORY
Weight
Height.
(a) When did symptoms first appear or accident happen? i'_/_/%& (Please list dates for various
diagnoses, if appropriate.)
Mo. Day Yr.
(b) When did patient cease work because of disability? l£l
/SU
(c) Has patient ever had same or similar condition?
Md. Day Yr.
/JCj no / / yes If "yes" state when and describe.

(d) Objective findings (including current X-rays, EKG's, laboratory data and clinical findings)

(e) Names and addresses of other treating physicians

3. DATES OF TREATMENT
(a) Date of first visit iJjQV]

(b) Date of last visit /JV/JP/*?/

Mo. Day Yr.

Mo. Day Yr.

(c) Frequency /__/ Weekly /£/ Monthly /_/ Other (Specify)
(d) Is patient still under your care for this condition(s)?
ifi yes
/_/ no If "no," indicate date service terminated. / _ / _ / _ /
Mo. Day Yr.

4. NATURE OF TREATMENT (Including surgery and medications prescribed, if any)

KUnr\fc

§

V*\

O.S

^ V

5. PROGRESS
(a) Has patient /_/Recovered? /_/Improved? / # Stabilized? /_/Retrogressed?
(b) Is patient /£/ Ambulatory? /_/House confined? /_/ Bed confined? /_/Hospital confined?
(c) Has patient been hospital confined?
1)0 no /_/ yes If "yes," give Name and Address of Hospital

Confined from / _ / _ / _ _ / through /__/_/__/
Mo. Day Yr.

Mo. Day Yr.

If hospitalization has occurred at multiple facilities, please list them on a separate sheet of paper.
6. CARDIAC
(If Applicable)
(a) Functional Capacity
(American Heart Assoc.)

Class 1 (No limitation) /_/
Class 2 (Slight limitation) /_/
Class 3 (Marked limitation) /_/
Class 4 (Complete limitation) /_/

(b) Blood Pressure (last visit)

/
Systolic

Diastolic

7. LIMITATIONS
(a) What are patient's present capabilities?
(b) What are patient's present limitations (physical and/or mental)?
(c) What restrictions are placed oh patient? *

f •

*-

j

0

8. PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT
(as defined in Federal Dictionary of Occupational Titles)
/_/
/_/
/__/
/__/

Class 1 -No limitation of functional capacity; capable of heavy work; no restrictions. (1-10%)
Class 2 -Medium manual activity. (15-30%)
Class 3 - Slight limitations of functional capacity; capable of light work. (35-55%)
Class 4 - Moderate limitation of functional capacity; capable of clerical/ administrative (sedentary)
activity. (60-70%)
I)(J Class 5 - Severe limitation of functional capacity; incapable of minimal (sedentary) activity.
(75-100%)
/_./ Remarks:

9. MENTAL / NERVOUS IMPAIRMENT
(if applicable)
(a) What is impact of stress on patient's daily activities?

(b) What stress and problems in interpersonal relations has patient experienced?

/_/ Class 1 - Patient is able to function under stress and engage in interpersonal relations (no
limitation).
I J Class 2 - Patient is able to function in most stress situations and engage in most interpersonal
relations (slight limitations).
IJ Class 3 - Patient is able to engage in only limited stress situations and engage in only limited
interpersonal relations (moderate limitations).
Ijgl Class 4 - Patient is unable to engage in stress situations or engage in interpersonal relations
(marked limitations).
/_/ Class 5 - Patient has significant loss of psychological, physiological, personal ana social
adjustment (severe limitations).
/ / Remarks:

10. PROGNOSIS
(a) What is the patient's prognosis? Specify a prognosis for each of the various diagnoses
listed. Use a separate sheet if necessary. /Jo ( ^ y w v f r ^ ^
AuAfy^fa^

(b) How long from now do you feel patient's maximum medical improvement will be reached?
/_/ 3 months /_/ 6 months /_/1 year /_/ longer /£/ no improvement expected

11. SIGNATURE
(Print)

Name of Attending Physician

Street Address

H

1TTI<SC£^

Signature

Degree

City or Town

ft. deuru^
^

S*2

Specialty

Telephone

State or Province

Zip Code

*fc*M
Date

APPENDIX K

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
[CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES]
SET OUT VERBATIM

Rule 3

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177
(1924); Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P.
1046 (1927); Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070 (1936).

gal claims. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63
Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 (1924).
—Relief granted.
Court could administer relief according to
nature of cause, whether it would have been
granted in equity or at law. Morgan v. Child,
Cole & Co., 47 Utah 417, 155 P. 451 (1916);

Cited in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144
(Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 30.
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 55 to 57.
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 22 to 25.

PART II.
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND
ORDERS.
Rule 3. Commencement of action.
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint
with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a copy of the
complaint in accordance with Rule 4. If the action is commenced by the service
of a summons and a copy of the complaint, then the complaint, the summons
and proof of service, must be filed within ten days of such service. If, in a case
commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons and
proof of service are not filed within ten days of service, the action commenced
shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no further jurisdiction
thereof; provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not change the
requirement of Utah Code Ann. Section 12-1-8 (1986).
(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of
filing of the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the complaint.
(Amended effective April 1, 1990.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 3 constitutes a significant change from the prior
rule. The rule retains service of the ten-day
summons as one of two means to commence an
action, but the rule requires that the summons
together with a copy of the complaint be served
on the defendant pursuant to Rule 4. In so doing, the rule eliminates the requirement that a
copy of the complaint be deposited with the
clerk for the defendant whose address is unknown. The changes in Rule 3 must be read
and should be interpreted in conjunction with
coordinate changes in Rule 4 and with a
change in Rule 12(a) that begins the running
of the defendant's 20-day response time from
the service of the summons and complaint.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates
the requirement that a copy of the complaint
be deposited with the clerk for the defendant

whose address is unknown. Paragraph (b) of
the former rule, which permitted the plaintiff
to deposit copies of the complaint with the
clerk for defendants not otherwise served with
a copy at the time of the service of the summons, has also been eliminated. The rule requires, in effect, that both the summons and
the complaint be served pursuant to Rule 4.
Under a coordinate change in Rule 12(a), the
defendant's time for answering or otherwise responding to the complaint does not begin to
run until service of the summons and complaint pursuant to Rule 4.
Paragraph (b). This paragraph is substantially identical to paragraph (c) of the former
rule.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment in Subdivision (a) inserted "together with
a copy of the complaint in accordance with

4
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between title of the summons and the title of
the complaint was not a proper basis to set
aside default judgment granted by trial court
Bawden & Assocs v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676
(Utah 1981).

Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79,
P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d
(Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P 2d
(Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d
(Utah 1989).

493
760
245
449

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352; 62 Am Jur 2d Process § 5.

C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 80; 71 C.J.S
Pleading §§ 408 to 412, 72 C.J.S Process § 3
Key Numbers. — Courts <s= 21 et seq.;
Pleading <^=> 331; Process «=» 4 to 6.

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and
served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing,
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the
court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2),
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process;
6
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
davit with motions setting forth theories, and
judgment had been on pleadings, court and
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds
for motion Howard v Howard, 11 Utah 2d
149, 356 P 2 d 275 (1960)

ANALYSIS

Motions
—Amendments
Prayer for relief
—New trial
Particulanzation
—Setting aside conditional order
Orders
—Correction
Cited
Motions.
—Amendments.
Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court ma\ den^ a motion to
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
present a written motion and a proposed
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
the prayer does not limit the relief which the
court may grant Behrens v Raleigh Hills
H o s p , 675 P 2 d 1179 (Utah 1983)
—New trial.
Particularization.
Only purpose for requiring particulanzation
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform
court and other party of theories upon which
new trial is sought, where defendant filed affi-

—Setting aside conditional order.
Where court on own initiative lowered from
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by
jur> and entered conditional order granting
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduction, court could restore jury findings under
authonU of this Rule, since plaintiff filed motion to set aside conditional order for new trial
within ten days National Farmers' Union
Propertv & Cas Co v Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
286 P 2 d 249, 61 A L.R 2d 635 (1955)
Orders.
—Correction.
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption
that order prepared by counsel correctly reflected judgment of Supreme Court and trial
court, judge could correct order on his own motion Meagher v Equity Oil Co , 5 Utah 2d 196,
299 P 2 d 827 (1956)
Cited in Boskovich v Utah Constr Co., 123
Utah 387, 259 P 2d 885 (1953), Thomas v
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507
(1956)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am J u r 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders ^ 1 et seq , 61A Am J u r 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq , 238

as affected bv presentation of counterclaim, 8
A L R 3 d 1361
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A L.R 3d 1113
Key Numbers. — Motions «= 1 et seq.;
Pleading «=» 38 1 2 to 186, 187 et seq

C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders § 1
et seq , 71 C J S Pleading §* 63 tc 210, 140 et
seq , 211 et seq
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summery judgment

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief: and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
22
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part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, Rule 15.
Arbitration, § 78-31a-l et seq.
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq.
Defenses and objections, Rule 12.
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14; Appx. G, Code
of Judicial Administration.
Fellow servant defined. § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, Rule 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, Rule 84.
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Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule
12<d).
Interpleader, Rule 22.
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24.
Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b).
One form of action. Rule 2.
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a).
Security
interest,
enforceability
of,
§ 70A-9-203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished, Rule 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, $ 25-5-1 et seq.
Statute of frauds, investment securities,
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
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tStCtitor or administrator of plaintiff who prohm*A to bring the action in that capacity withOUt previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th
|98.
Key Numbers. — Associations <£=> 20(5);
Corporations «= 513(4), 514; Damages *=» 142;

Rule 10

Libel and Slander «=» 77 et seq., 90 et seq.; Limitation of Actions <s=> 183; Parties «=» 72 to 74;
Pleading <s=> 8(1), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18),
14, 32. 39, 46. 59, 63; Quieting Title <s=> 34(3);
Statutes «=» 280.

Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the
name of the first party on each side with an .indication that there are other
parties. A party whose name is not knowrn shall be designated by any name
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances;
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all
purposes.
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed
paper of letter size (8 ll{ x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a righthand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side
of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink.
(0 Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for noncon33
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forming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve
any party of any requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the
original.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.)
with the court complies with these standards,
the papers should not be deemed to violate the
rule merely because they were prepared in a
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this
paragraph also removes any confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
inch).
Paragraph (e>. This paragraph, which is an
addition to the rule, requires typed signature
lines and signatures in permanent black or
blue ink.
Paragraph (f). The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must accept
all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk may require counsel
to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel; for good cause shown,
the court may relieve parties of the obligation
to comply with the rule or any part of it.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment added "and other papers" to the rule
catchline and added similar language in two
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a),
added the last phrase in the subdivision heading, added the last two phrases in the first sentence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule
(7Ma)," added the last two sentences, and made
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d);
added Subdivisions (e) and (f); and redesignated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision
(g).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 10, F.R.C.P.

Advisory Committee Note. — As a general
matter. Rule 10 deals with the form of papers
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as defined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with
the court," including motions, memoranda, discover}' responses, and orders. The changes in
the present rule were promulgated to clarify
ambiguities in the prior rule and to address
specific problems encountered by the courts.
Paragraphs (b), <c> and «e» of the rule were not
changed, except that paragraph (e) was redesignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (f)
were added.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies requirements for captions in every paper filed
with the court. In addition to the other requirements, the caption must contain the name of
the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the
judge's name is known at the time the paper is
filed. In the top left-hand corner of the first
page, each paper must state identifying information concerning the attorney representing
the party filing the paper. Finally, every pleading must state the name and current address of
the party for whom it is filed; this information
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of
the last page. This information need not be set
forth in papers other than pleadings.
Paragraph (d). The changes in this paragraph make it clear that papers filed with the
court must be "typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type." The Advisory Committee
considered suggestions from different groups
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifically allowed or specifically prohibited. The
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the
requirements that "typing or printing shall be
clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exhibits.

of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

—Use as pleadings.
While an exhibit may be considered as a part

Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
Cited.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.

A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.
Key Numbers. — Pleading <s=> 4. 13, 15, 38V2
to 75, 307 to 312, 340.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168
(1954).

ANALYSIS

Amendment of complaint.
Violation.
—Question of law.
—Sanctions.
Cited.

Violation.
—Question of law.
-»
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola- '
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. (
Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. j
1989).
—^

Amendment of complaint.
Amendment by an attorney of the facts
stated in a complaint was sufficient to establish those facts as they would have been by a
verified complaint before the changes made by
this rule making verification unnecessary.

—Sanctions.
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of
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Rule 41

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary7 dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the nlaintiff has
complied with the order.
Ill
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instructions Morgan v Quailbrook Condominnim Co, 704 P2d 573 (Utah 1985)
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction Fuller v Zinik Sporting Goods Co , 538 P 2d 1036
(Utah 1975)
Cited in Wellman v Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P 2d 701 (1961), Hill v Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P 2d 186 (1962), Ortega v Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P 2d 406 (1963), Meier v
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P 2d 734

Rule 52

(1964), Memmott v United States Fuel Co , 22
Utah 2d 356, 453 P2d 155 (1969), Telford v
Newell J Olsen & Sons Constr Co 25 Utah
2d 270, 480 P 2d 462 (1971), Flynn v W P
Harhn Constr Co , 29 Utah 2d 327 509 P 2d
356 (1973), McGinn v Utah Power & Light
Co, 529 P 2d 423 (Utah 1974), Henderson v
Meyer, 533 P 2d 290 (Utah 1975), Lamkin v
Lynch, 600 P 2d 530 (Utah 1979), State v Hall,
671 P 2d 201 (Utah 1983), Highland Constr
Co v Union Pac R R, 683 P 2d 1042 (Utah
1984), Gill v Timm, 720 P 2d 1352 (Utah
1986), Pem-od v Carter, 737 P 2d 199 (Utah
1987), K n g v Fereday, 739 P 2d 618 (Utah
1987), State v Cox, 751 P 2d 1152 (Utah Ct
App 1988), Ramon ex rel Ramon v Farr, 770
P2d 131 'Utah 1989)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am Jur 2d Trial § 573
et seq
C.J.S. — 88 C J S Trial §§ 266 to 448
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A L R 3d
501
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A L R 3 d 10
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A L R 3d 88
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A L R 3 d 170
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A L R 3 d 1081
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A L R 3 d 1281
Verdict urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A L R 3d 845
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A L R 3 d 1154
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A L R 3d 128
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A L R 3 d 102
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure construction and effect of provision in Rule 51 and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A L R Fed 310
Key Numbers. — Trial «* 182 to 296

Rule 52. Findings by the court,
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of
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fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of th P grrmnd for it-g
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56^3X1^32
wlfen the motion is based on more than one ground.
~(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made nbTiafer than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preceding "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth
sentence and added the last sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.

Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
lav; or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.
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Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written. 10 A.L.R.Sd 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
J
.
.,
.,
jury in civil case ofr scene ofr accidentA or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propnetv and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein. 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case. 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in

case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
m a ( j e in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case w h e r e Jurv

has been

waived

or

not

bv parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
, .
.
. . ,
.
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on *
, n o A T ^ °, . , _ A
a
n
PPeal' 3 8 , A 1 R - 4 t h
™'
^
. ^ waiver as binding on later state
C1
t n a L 48
™
A.L.R.4th 747.
Court
reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new
trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Key N u m b e r s . — New Trial «=» 13 et seq..
110, 116.
demanded

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice^ relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3).fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action: (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shallTTe^made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
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Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim Utah Rules of Evi-

dence (1971) was not as specific, but Rule 106
is otherwise m accord with Utah practice

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 73

ARTICLE II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the
law of judicial notice formerly contained in
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence
(197H and in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-24-1
[78-25-1] (1953) [superseded b> this rule] into
one broadly defined rule The Utah Supreme
Court has stated the rule with reference to judicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co v
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 267, 289 Pac 116 (1930)
where the court stated "In short, a court is
presumed to know what every man of ordinary
intelligence must know about such things "
See also DeFusion Co v Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 613 P 2d 1120 (Utah 1980)
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with
instances in which a court may notice legislative facts, which is left to the sound discretion
of trial and appellate courts Compare Rule 12,

Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) Since legislative facts are matters that go to the policy of a
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that
are used in the adjudication of a controversy
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence
and best left to the law-making considerations
by appellate and trial courts
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little
Cottonwood Water Co case, supra, and the
substance of Rule 9(1) and (2), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971) Utah law presumes that the
law of another jurisdiction is the same as that
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has
been taken from the law of other states and
foreign countries Lamberth v Lamberth, 550
P 2 d 200 (Utah 1976), Maple v Maple, 566
P 2 d 1229 (Utah 1977) The Utah court has
taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), UtaD
Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regulations of the Tax Commission Nelson v State
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Rule 603

cess right to a fair trial State v Fulton, 742
P 2d 1208 (Utah 1987). cert denied, — U S — ,
108 S Ct 777, 98 L Ed 2d 864 (1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 66
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81
(1989)
A.L.R. — Admissibility of affidavit to impeach witness, 14 A L R 4th 828
Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations made by one incompetent to
testify at trial, 15 A L R 4th 1043

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child's
testimony in criminal case, 32 A L R 4th 1196
Deaf-mute as witness, 50 A L R 4th 1188
Dead man's statutes as affected by Rule 601
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and similar
state rules, 50 A.L R 4th 1238
Contingent fee informant testimony in state
prosecutions, 57 A L R 4th 643
Witnesses- child competency statutes, 60
A.L R 4th 369

Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and embodies the

substance of Rule 10 [Rule 19], Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Incomplete memory
Cited
Incomplete memory.
This rule merely requires that the witness
have had the opportunity and the capacity to

perceive the events in question Testimony of a
witness need not be excluded if the witness's
memory of 1 he subject matter of the testimony
is less than complete State v Eldredge, 773
P 2d 29 (Utah 1989)
Cited in State v Jones, 656 P 2d 1012 (Utah
1982)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note. Hypnosis and
the Defendant's Right to Testify in a Criminal
Case. 1989 Utah L Rev 545

Rule 603. Oath or affirmation.
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim The oath or affirmation need not be in any special form but only
such as to awaken the conscience of the witness and impress the witness with the duty to

testify truthfully The rule is a modified version of Rule 18, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
Cross-References. — Administration and
form of oath or affirmation. ^ 78-7-17,
78-24-16 to 78-24-19
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Rule 702

ARTICLE VII.
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
jlule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
miderstanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence

(1971) Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), contained similar language

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Pregnancy
Relation to expert testimony
Pregnancy.
The admission of a mother's testimony on
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy
was not error Roods v Roods, 645 P 2d 640
(Utah 1982)

Relation to expert testimony.
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a
security guard, who compared a photograph of
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at burglarized premises The fact that a question
might be capable of scientific determination
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the
provisions of this rule are met State v Ellis,
748 P 2d 188 (Utah 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by
lay witness, 10 A L R 3d 258
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle
involved in accident, 33 A L R 3d 1405
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-

mony as to weather conditions, 56 A L R 3d
575
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify,
in criminal case, based upon personal observation, as to whether person was under the influence of drugs, 21 A L R 4th 905

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule verbatim Rule 56(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) was substantially the
same
Cross-Referenees. — Blood tests to determine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18
to 78-25-23, 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10

Discovery of expeita opinion Rule 26'bw4^
URCP
Drug paraphernalia expert opinion in determining nature of object as § 58-37a-4
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U R C P
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Rule 29

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
£ni. JUT. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 691 to 701.
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error §§ 1316
to 1332

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 756,
758 3.

Rule 28. Prehearing conference.
The court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before the
court, a justice, judge, or an appointed referee for a prehearing conference to
consider the simplification of the issues and such other matters as may aid in
the disposition of the proceeding by the court. The court, justice, judge, or
appointed referee shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered, and which limits the issues to those not disposed of by admissions
or agreements of counsel, and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the proceeding, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice.

Rule 29. Oral argument.
(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in all cases unless the court
concludes:
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or
(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively decided; or
(3) The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the
briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly
aided by oral argument.
(b) Priority of argument. Cases shall be scheduled for oral argument in
accordance with the following list of priorities:
(1) Appeals from convictions in which the death penalty has been imposed;
(2) Appeals from convictions in all other criminal matters;
(3) Appeals from habeas corpus petitions and other post-conviction proceedings;
(4) Appeals from orders concerning child custody or termination of parental rights;
(5) Matters relating to the discipline of attorneys;
(6) Matters relating to applicants who have failed to pass the bar examination;
(7) Petitions for review of Industrial Commission orders;
(8) Appeals from the orders of the Juvenile Court;
(9) Appeals from actions involving public elections;
(10) Petitions for review of Public Service Commission orders;
(11) Appeals from interlocutory orders;
(12) Questions certified to the Supreme Court by a court of the United
States:
(13) Original writ proceedings;
(14) Petitions for certiorari that have been granted;
(15) Petitions to review administrative agency orders not included
within other categories; and
453
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(16) Any matter not included within the above categories.
(c) Notice by clerk and request by a party for argument; postponement. Not later than 30 days prior to the term of court in which a case is to be
submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties that oral argument is to be
permitted, the time and place of oral argument, and the time to be allowed
each side. Oral argument shall proceed as scheduled unless all parties waive
the same in writing filed with the clerk not later than 15 days from the date of
the clerk's notice. A request for postponement of the argument or for allowance of additional time must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance of
the date fixed for hearing.
(d) Order and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and
conclude the argument. The opening argument shall include a fair statement
of the case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at length from briefs, records
or authorities.
(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or separate appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at a single argument, unless the court otherwise
directs. If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the action below shall
be deemed the appellant for the purpose of this rule unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument.
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present.
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument.
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be
argued.
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best.
Advisory Committee Note. — The former
practice was to presume that argument was
waived unless requested The amendments
change the practice to presume that argument
is requested unless expressly waived

The rule incorporates the oral argument priority classification formerly found in the admimstrative orders of the Supreme Court

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L Rev 150
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 697 to 699

454

C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error ^ 1401Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *» 824

ijy narrow rormalistic
interpretations
which disregarded the spirit and letter of
the section. Wright v. Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co., Ind.1040, 61 S.Ct. 19o\ 311 U.S.
273, 85 L.Ed. 184, 44 Am Bankr.Kep.N.S.
280, rehearing denied 61 S.Ct. 445, 312 17.
S. 711. 85 L.Ed. 1142.

§ 362.

2.

Findings
Finding that trustee will be able to
-economic depreciation" on the
1>av t h e
„ e cured creditor's equipment so as to approximately preserve their status quo
In re Bermec
w a 8 n o t d e a r l y erroneous.
Corporation, C.A.N.Y.1071, 445 F.2d 367.

Automatic stay

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of—
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of
the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any
claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before
the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title does not operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the
debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;
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(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect
an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and
powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this
title;
' (4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of
any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts,
forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options,
warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts
or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securities;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement
of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any case in
which the mortgage or deed of trust held by said Secretary is
insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing
Act and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting
of five or more living units; or
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the
debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this
section—
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no
longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this
section continues until the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed f
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13
of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied.
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(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property;
and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section
for relief from the stay of any act against property of the estate
under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with
respect to the party in interest making such request, unless the
court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in
effect pending, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination
under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with
the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section. If the hearing
under this subsection is a preliminary hearing—
(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such
stay will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
section; and
(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days
after such preliminary hearing.
(f) The court, without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the
stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to
prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property,
if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity
for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section
concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of
this section—
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof
on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on
all other issues.
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6,1978, 92 Stat. 2570.

Ch. 3
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11 § 362

Historical a n d Revision Notes
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, not affect the right ot creditors. It simSenate Report No. 95-98©. The automatic ply stays itH enforcement pending an orstay if* one of the fundamental debtor derly examination of the debtor's and
protections provided by the bankruptcy creditors' rights.
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing
Legislative
Statements.
Section
Hpell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all 362(a)(1) of the House amendment adopts
foreclosure actions. It permits the debt- the provision contained in the Senate
or to attempt a repayment or reorganiza- amendment enjoining the commencement
tion plan, or simply to be relieved of the or continuation of a judicial, administrafinancial pressures that drove him into tive, or other proceeding to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose bebankruptcy.
fore the commencement of the case. The
The action commenced by the party provision is beneficial and interacts with
seeking relief from the stay is referred section 362(a)(6), which also covers asto as a motion to make it clear that at sessment, to prevent harassment of the
the expedited hearing under subsection debtor with respect to pre-petition
(e), and at hearings on relief from the claims.
stay, the only issue will be the lack of
Section 362(a)(7) contains a provision
adequate protection, the debtor's equity
in the property, and the necessity of the contained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the
property to an effective reorganization of House. The differing provision in the
the debtor, or the existence of other cause Senate amendment was rejected. It is
for relief from the stay. This hearing not possible that a debt owing to the
will not be the appropriate time at which debtor may be offset against an interest
to bring in other issues, such as counter- in the debtor.
claims against the creditor, which, alSection 362(a)(8) is new. The provision
though relevant to the question of the
amount of the debt, concern largely col- stays the commencement or continuation
lateral or unrelated matters. This ap- of any proceeding concerning the debtor
proach is consistent with that taken in before the U. S. Tax Court.
cases such as In re Essex Properties, Ltd.,
430 F.Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal.1977), that an
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the
action seeking relief from the stay Is not stay under section 362(a)(1) does not apthe assertion of a claim which would give ply to affect the commencement or conrise to the right or obligation to assert tinuation of an action or proceeding by a
counterclaims. Those counterclaims are governmental unit to enforce the governnot to be handled in the summary fashion mental unit's police or regulatory power.
that the preliminary hearing under this This section is intended to be given a
provision will be. Rather, they will be narrow construction in order to permit
the subject of more complete proceedings governmental units to pursue actions to
by the trustee to recover property of the protect the public health and safety and
estate or to object to the allowance of a not to apply to actions by a governmenclaim. However, this would not preclude tal unit to protect a pecuniary interest in
the party seeking continuance of the stay property of the debtor or property of the
from presenting evidence on the existence estate.
of claims which the court may consider
in exercising its discretion. What is preSection 362(b)(6) of the House amendcluded is a determination of such col- ment adopts a provision contained in the
lateral claims on the merits at the hear- Senate amendment restricting the exceping.
tion to the automatic stay with respect
to setoffs to permit only the setoff of
[For additional discussion, see Notes of mutual debts and claims. Traditionally,
the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate the right of setoff has been limited to
Report No. 95-989, set out under section mutual debts and claims and the lack of
the clarifying term "mutual" in H.R. 8200
361 of this title.]
as passed by the House created an uninNotes of Committee on the Judiciary, tentional ambiguity. Section 362(b)(7) of
House Report No. 05-595. Paragraph (7) the House amendment permits the issu[of 8ubsec. (a)] stays setoffs of mutual ance of a notice of tax deficiency. The
amendment
rejects
section
debts and credits between the debtor and House
creditors. As with all other paragraphs 362(b)(7) in the Senate amendment. It
would have permitted a particular gov-

16-10-13

CORPORATIONS

16-10-13. Service of process on corporation — Registered
agent or division director as agents for receipt of
service.
(1) The registered agent appointed by a corporation is the agent of the
corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand required or permitted
by law to be served upon the corporation may be served.
(2) Whenever a corporation fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent
to this state, or whenever its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered office, then the director of the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code is the agent of the corporation upon whom
any process, notice, or demand may be served. Service on the director of the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of any process, notice, or demand shall be made by delivering to and leaving with him, or with any clerk
having charge of the corporation department of that office, an original and one
copy of the process, notice, or demand. In the event any process, notice, or
demand is served on the director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, he shall immediately cause one of the copies to be forwarded by
registered or certified mail, addressed to the corporation at its registered
office. Any service upon the director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall be returnable in not less than 30 days.
(3) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall keep a record
of all processes, notices, and demands served upon it under this section, and
shall record the time of the service and its action on the service.
(4) Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any
process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served upon a
corporation in any other manner permitted by law.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 13; 1979,, ch. 57,
§ 2; 1984, ch. 66, § 84; 1985, ch. 178, § 32.
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amendment substituted references to Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and its director for references to secretary of state throughout the section.
The 1985 amendment substituted "is the
agent of the corporation" in Subsection (1) for
"shall be an agent of such corporation"; substituted "fails to appoint" near the beginning of
Subsection (2) for "shall fail to appoint"; substituted "is the agent of the corporation upon
whom any process, notice, or demand may be
served" at the end of the first sentence of Subsection (2) for "shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom any such process, notice, or
demand may be served"; substituted "an original and one copy of the process, notice, or de-
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mand" at the end of the second sentence of Subsection (2) for "duplicate copies of such process,
notice, or demand"; deleted "thereof " in the
third sentence after "one of the copies"; substituted "any service upon the director" at the
beginning of the fourth sentence for "any service so had on the director"; substituted "the
time of the service and its action on the service" at the end of Subsection (3) for therein
the time of such service and its action with
reference thereto"; substituted "this section
limits or affects" near the beginning of Subsection (4) for "this section shall limit or affect";
and made minor changes in phraseology.
Cross-References. — Assumed name, persons doing business under, § 42-2-11.
Personal service upon corporation in state,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(4).
Service on foreign corporations, § 16-10-111.

31A-2-310

INSURANCE CODE
§ 31A-15-101 in Subsection (l)(c) seem mcor
rect That section deals with the purposes of
Chapter 15 Section 31A-15-102 deals with
assisting unauthorized insurers

"agents" for "attorneys" in Subsections (2)
and (3), and made minor stylistic changes
throughout the section
Compiler's Notes. — The references to

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Foreign insurance company
—Claims arising within state
Out-of-state claims
Out-of-state claims.
Foreign insurer with an office in Utah was
served through insurance commissioner of
Utah and was required to defend a cause of
action arising out-of-state Gibbons & Reed
Co v Standard Accident Ins Co, 191 F
Supp 174 (D Utah 1960)

Foreign insurance company.
—Claims arising within state.
All legal service against a foreign insurance company for causes of action arising
within the state of Utah is to be served on the
Utah insurance commissioner Gibbons &
Reed Co v Standard Accident Ins Co , 191
F Supp 174 (D Utah 1960)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — In Personam Juris- business transaction within state, 20
diction Expanded Utah's Long-Arm Statute, A L R 3d 1201
Construction and application of state stat1970 Utah L Rev 222
C.J.S. — 44 C J S Insurance §S#82, 83, 84, utes or rules of court predicating in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign cor46 C J S Insurance § 1626
A.L.R. — Federal or state law as control- porations on making or performing a contract
ling, in diversity action, whether foreign cor- within the state, 23 A L R 3d 551
Jurisdictional acts described in statutes
poration is amenable to service of process in
dealing with insurance contracts, 23
state,6ALR3dll03
Attorney representing foreign corporation A L R 3d 606
Construction and application, as to isolated
in litigation as its agent for service of process
in unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 acts oi transactions, of state statutes or rules
of court predicating in personam jurisdiction
A L R 3d 738
Who is "general" or "managing" agent of over nonresidents or foreign corporations
foreign corporation under statute authonzmg upon the doing of an act or upon doing or
service of process on such agent, 17 A L R 3d transacting business or "any" business,
within a state, 27 A L R 3d 397
625
Personal liability of stockholder, officer or
Validity, as a matter of due process of
state statutes or rules of court conferring in agent for debt of foreign corporation doing
personam jurisdiction over nonresident or business in the state 27 A L R 4th 387
Key Numbers. — Insurance «=> 16 26
foreign corporations on the basis of isolated

31A-2-310. Procedure for service of process through
state officer.
(1) Service upon the commissioner or lieutenant governor under
§ 31A-2-309 is service on the principal, if
(a) two copies of the process are delivered personally or to the office
of the official designated in § 31A-2-309, and
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31A-2-311

(b) that official mails a copy of the process to the person to be served
according to Subsection (2)(b).
(2) (a) The commissioner and the lieutenant governor shall give receipts for and keep records of all process served through them.
(b) The commissioner or the lieutenant governor shall immediately
send by certified mail one copy of the process received to the person to
be served at that person's last known principal place of business, residence, or post-office address. The commissioner or the lieutenant governor shall retain the other copy for his files.
(c) No plaintiff or complainant may take a judgment py default in
any proceeding in which process is served under this settion and
§ 31A-2-309 until the expiration of 40 days from the date of service of
process under Subsection (2Kb).
(3) Proof of service shall be evidenced by a certificate by the official
designated in § 31A-2-309, showing service made upon him and mailing by
him, and attached to a copy of the process presented to him for that purpose.
(4) When process is served under § 31A-2-310, the words "twenty days"
in the first sentence of Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall
be changed to read "forty days."
History: C. 1953, 31A-2-310, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 7 ; L 1986, ch. 204, § 27.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection
(2)(b), deleted "official designated in

§ 31A-2-309" following "lieutenant governor" in the first sentence and substituted
"commissioner or the lieutenant governor"
for "official" in the second sentence.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 84.
Key Numbers. — Insurance *» 26.

31A-2-311. Reciprocal enforcement of foreign decrees.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Reciprocal state" means a state whose laws contain procedures
substantially similar to those specified in this section for the enforcement of decrees or orders issued by courts located in other states
against an insurer authorized to do business in the reciprocal state,
and which recognizes Utah as a reciprocal state under its law.
(b) "Foreign decree" means a decree or order of a court located in a
reciprocal state, including a United States court located in a reciprocal
state against an insurer authorized to do business in Utah.
(2) The commissioner shall determine which states qualify as reciprocal
states and shall maintain a list of them.
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41-6-32

(b) upon request and if available exhibit his operator's license to any
investigating peace officer present and to the person struck or the operator or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or owner of other
property damaged in the accident; and
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance,
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the transporting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the
transporting is requested by the injured person.
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
or death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $400 or
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication available give notice of the accident to the nearest office of an authorized law
enforcement agency.
(3) When the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an
immediate notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and
there is another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of
doing so, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice not given by
the operator.
(4) When the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of
an accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of
the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within
15 days after becoming aware of the accident make the report not made by the
operator.
History-* L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943,
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated the previously undesignated provisions of this section as amended by
Laws 1983, ch. 183, § 32; in Subsection (1), in
the introductory paragraph substituted "operator" for "driver," inserted "or other property"
following "damage to any vehicle," substituted

"operated" for "driven," m Subsection (l)(a) mserted "to any person involved" at the beginning, and m Subsection (l)(b) inserted "to any
investigating peace officer present and," substituted "operator" for "driver," substituted "or
owner of other property damaged in the accident" for "collided with and shall", made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout Subsection (1); and added present
Subsections (2) through (4).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 A Am Jur 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 294
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the opera-

tor of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his
operator's license or the vehicle registration
certificate, 6 A L.R.3d 506.

41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other property — Duties of operator.
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in
damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and either
locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of other
property of the operator's name and address and the registration number of
the vehicle causing the damage, or shall attach securely in a conspicuous
place on the vehicle or other property a written notice giving the operator's
407
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MOTOR VEHICLES

name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the
damage. If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections
41-6-31(2) and (3).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 22; C. 1943,
57-7-99; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 2; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" for "driver"
throughout the section, in the present last sentence substituted "under Subsections 41-6-

31(2) and (3)" for "as provided in Section
41-6-34 " omitted the former last sentence,
which read "Any person failing to comply with
said requirements under such circumstances is
guilty of an infraction" and made minor
changes m phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motor Vehicles § 43
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=* 10

41-6-33, 41-6-34. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 41-6-33 (L 1941, ch 52,
k 23, C 1943, 57-7-100), relating to accidents
resulting only in damage to fixtures legally
upon or adjacent to a highway, was repealed by
Laws 1977, ch 269, § 6

Laws L987, ch 138, § 106, repeals § 41-6-34
as last amended by Laws 1979, ch 242, § 7,
concerning reporting accidents involving mjury, death, or damage of $400 or more For
present provisions, see § 41-6-31

41-6-35. Accident reports — Duty of operator and investigative officer to forward or render.
(1) The department may request any operator of a vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage
to the apparent extent of $400 or more to, within ten days after the request,
forward a written report of the accident to the department.
(2) The department may require any operator of a vehicle involved in an
accident, of which report is made under Subsection (1), to file supplemental
reports when the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the department and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the department.
(3) A written accident report is not required under this section from any
person who is physically incapable of making a report, during his period of
incapacity.
(4) Every peace officer, who in the regular course of duty, investigates a
motor vehicle accident described under Subsection (1), shall file a report of the
accident with the department within ten days after completing the investigation. The report shall be made either at the time of and at the scene of the
accident or later by interviewing participants or witnesses.
(5) The written reports required to be filed with the department by peace
officers and the information in them are not privileged or confidential.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943,
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 86,
§ 1; 1969, ch. 106, § 1; 1973, ch. 82, § 1; 1979,
ch. 242, § 8; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1987,
ch. 138, § 27.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 (2nd S S )

amendment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted
"department may request any" and substituted
"to within ten days after the request" for "shall
within five days after such accident" and "the
accident" for "such accident" in Subsection (a),
substituted "is made under Subsection (a)" for
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am J u r id rore.sm Corporations ^ 63

C.J.S. — 20 C J S Corporations * 1960
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=> 678

PART 8
NUISANCES
76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined — Violation — Classification of offense.
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is
dangerous to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or
unwholesome.
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Boards of health to abate, sv 26-24-14
Brothels declared a nuisance, * 47-1-1

History: C. 1953, 76-10-801, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-801.
Cross-References. — Alcoholic be\erages
property used in connection with declared nuisance i* 32A-13-6

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Civil liability for violation of section.
Defendant could be held liable under the doctrine of nuisance per se for the pollution of
plaintiffs culinary water wells caused b\ the
percolation of defendant's toxic formation
waters, which were stored on defendant s land.
into the subterranean water system that fed
plaintifFs wells where the acts of the defendant
were in violation of this section and former
§ 73-14-5. wnich was in effect at the time.

Branch \ Western Petroleum, Inc . 657 P 2d
267 (Utah 1982)
Liabiht\ for damages for injuries occasioned
by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air, and obnoxious odors, being cast upon one's property
b\ another was not absolute, and law did not
afford redress for every such discomfort or annovance. extreme rights in this regard could
not be enforced Dahl \ Utah Oil Ref Co., 71
Utah 1, 11, 262 P 269 (1927)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am J u r 2d Nui-ances
& 1, 403
C.J.S. — 66 C . J S Nuisances fc 8
A.L.R. — Keeping pigs as a nuisance 2
A L R 3 d 931
Keeping poultry as nuisance. 2 A L R 3d
965
Electric generating plant or transformer &tation as nuisance, 4 A L R 3d 902
Keeping horses as nuisance. 27 ~A L R 3d
627

Operation of incinerator as nuisance, 41
A L R 3 d 1009
Zoo as a nuisance, 55 A L R 3d 1126
p 0 rnoshops or similar places disseminating
obscene materials as nuisance, 55 A L.R 3d
P o r t operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A L R 3d 253
Key Numbers. — Nuisance <?=> 59
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76-10-803

76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined.
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state
and consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty,
which act or omission either
(a) Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety
of three or more persons, or
(b) Offends public decency, or
(c) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any
public park, square, street, or highway, or
(d) In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use
of property
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified
m this section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance or
damage inflicted on individuals is unequal
History: C. 1953, 76-10-803, enacted by L.
1973, ch! 196, k 76-10-803.
Cross-References. — Pornograph\ offenses
deemed to offend public decenc> ^ 76-10-1210

Weeds failure to control as maintaining
public nuisance, ^ 4-17-8

NOTES TO DECISIONS
acts were unlawful and he was liable for them,
even though in committing such unlawful acts,
he wa^ in pursuit of lawful business and was
conducting such business in reasonable and
careful manner People v Burtleson, 14 Utah
258 47 P 87 (1896)

ANALYSIS

Canals
Lawful business
Motive or intent
Prescriptive rights
Canals.
Discharge into canal waters used b\ three or
more persons for irrigation and domestic purposes, of water that rendered canal waters
unfit for such purposes created public nuisance North Point Consol Irrigation Co \
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co , 16 Utah 246, 52
P 1 6 8 , 4 0 L R A 851 67 Am St R 607(1898)
Lawful business.
Where party so used his property as to
annoy, injure, or endanger comfort, repose,
health, or safety of three or more persons, his

Motive or intent.
In determining question of nuisance, motive
or intent with which act complained of was
committed could not be considered People \
Burtleson 14 Utah 258, 47 P 87 (1896)
Prescriptive rights.
There could be no prescriptive right to maintain public nuisance North Point Consol Irrigation Co \ Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co , 16
Utah 246, 52 P 168, 40 L R A 851, 67 Am St
R 607 (1898)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Uta« Law Review. — Comment Air Pollution, Nuisance Law, and Private Litigation,
1971 Utah L Rev 142
Comment, State v Rabe No Preseizure Adversary Hearing Required under Nuisance
Theory of Obscenity, 1971 Utah L Rev 582
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am J u r 2d Nuisances
§§ 35, 36

C.J.S — 66 C J S Nuisances t> 2
A.L.R. — Pornoshops or similar places disseminating obscene materials as nuisance, 55
A L R 3 d 1134
LiabihU of private landowner for vegetation
obscuring view at highwa> or street intersection 69 A L R 4th 1092
Key Numbers. — Nuisance «= 59
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76-10-808

action. If the action is instituted, however, to abate the distribution or exhibition of material alleged to offend public decency, the action shall be in the
form prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah for injunctions, but no
restraining order or injunction shall issue except upon notice to the person
sought to be enjoined; and that person shall be entitled to a trial of the issues
commencing within three days after filing of an answer to the complaint and a
decision shall be rendered by the court within two days after the conclusion of
the trial. As used in this part, ''distribute," "exhibit/' and "material" mean the
same as provided in section 76-10-1201.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-806, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ^ 76-10-806; 1977, ch. 92, \ 1.
Cross-References. — Actions to abate nuisances, ^ 78-38-1 et seq

Prosecution of pornography offenses
county or city attorney, fc 76-10-1215.

by

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am J u r 2d Nuisances
§fc 50, 232. 412
A.L.R. — Business interruption, without
physical damage, as actionable. 65 A L R 4th
1126

76-10-807.

C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S Nuisances ^ 111
Key Numbers. — Nuisance o 79.

Reserved.

76-10-808. Relief granted for public nuisance.
If the existence of a public nuisance as defined by Subsection
76-10-803(l)(b) is admitted or established, either in a civil or criminal proceeding, a judgment shall be entered which shall:
(a) Permanently enjoin each defendant and any other person from further maintaining the nuisance at the place complained of and each defendant from maintaining such nuisance elsewhere;
(b) Direct the person enjoined to surrender to the sheriff of the county
in which the action was brought any material in his possession which is
subject to the injunction, and the sheriff shall seize and destroy this material; and
(c) Without proof of special injury direct that an accounting be had and
alimonies and other consideration paid as admission to view any motion
picture film determined to constitute a public nuisance, or paid for any
publication determined to constitute a public nuisance, in either case
without deduction for expenses, be forfeited and paid into the general
funfl of the county where the nuisance was maintained.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-808, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 92, ft 2.
*

Cross-References. — Pornographic motion
picture films, § 76-10-1216 et seq
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78-38-1

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am J u r 2d Mortgages
§ 625 et seq
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages * 812
A.L.R. — Attorney's compensation in ab-

sence of contract or statute fixing amount. 57
A L R 3 d 475
Attorney's fees in matters in\olving real
property mortgages and deeds of trust, 58
A L R 3 d 215
Key Numbers. — Mortgages c=» 581(5)

CHAPTER 38
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER
DAMAGE
Section
78-38-1
78-38-2
78-38-3
78-38-4
78-38-4 5

78-38-4 6
78-38-4.7

Section
"Nuisance" defined — Right of action for — Judgment
Right of action for waste — Damages
Right of action for injuries to trees
— Damage
Limited damages in certain cases
Proof of ownership required to harvest or transport forest products
or native vegetation —- Definitions — Requirements for proof
of ownership
Enforcement
Transportation of forest products

78-38-4 8
78-38-4 9
78-38-5

78-38-6
78-38-7

78-38-8

or native vegetation into or
through the state.
Exemptions
Violation as misdemeanor
Manufacturing facility in operation over three \ e a r s — Limited
application of nuisance pro\isions
"Manufacturing facility" defined
Agricultural operation of over
three years duration — Application of nuisance provisions
limited
"Agricultural operation" defined

78-38-1. "Nuisance" defined — Right of action for — Judgment.
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an
action. Such action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by [the] nuisance; and
by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may
also be recovered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-38-1.
Cross-References. — Criminal nuisances,
§ 76-10-801 et seq

Municipal power to declare and abate nuisances, § 10-8-60
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